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Sovereign Immunity, Due Process, and the
Alden Trilogy
Carlos Manuel Vaizquezt

On the last day of the Supreme Court's 1998 Term, the Justices
delivered their opinions in Alden v. Maine' from the bench with great
drama,reportedlyholding spectatorsspellbound for close to an hour.2The
Court's holding in that case that the doctrine of sovereign immunity
protects states from being sued in their own courts without their consent
even on federal claims has been the subject of much commentary, most
of it unfavorable.3What has received less attention is that, in another
decision handed down the same day, Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
t Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. I am grateful to Brian Bix, Michael
Carroll, Julie Cohen, John Echeverria, Vicki Jackson, William Kelley, Richard Parker, Wendy
Collins Purdue, Jay Tidmarsh, and Mark Tushnet-and the participants in the Notre Dame Law
School Faculty Colloquium and Georgetown Faculty Workshop-for their comments. I am also
indebted to Peter KMasonfor outstanding research assistance.
1. 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999).
2. See Linda Greenhouse, States Are Given New Legal Shield by Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES,
June 24, 1999, at Al.
3. See, e.g., Ann Althouse, The Alden Trilogy: Still Searching for a Way To Enforce
Federalism,31 RUTGERSL.J. (forthcomingApr. 2000); Daniel A. Farber,Pledging a New
Allegiance: An Essay on Sovereignty and the New Federalism, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
(forthcoming Mar. 2000); William A. Fletcher, The Eleventh Amendment: Unfinished Business,
75 NOTREDAMEL. REV.(forthcomingMar.2000); Vicki C. Jackson,Principleand Compromise
in Constitutional Adjudication: The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity, 75
NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming Mar. 2000) [hereinafter Jackson, Principle and
Compromise]; Vicki C. Jackson, Seductions of Coherence, State Sovereign Immunity and the
Denationalization of Federal Law, 31 RUTGERSL.J. (forthcoming Apr. 2000); William P.
Marshall & Jason S. Cowart, State Immunity, Political Accountability, and Alden v. Maine, 75
NOTREDAMEL. REV.(forthcomingMar. 2000); Daniel J. Meltzer,State SovereignImmunity:
Five Authorsin Searchof a Theory,75 NOTREDAMEL. REV.(forthcomingMar.2000); John E.
Nowak, The Gang of Five and the Second Coming of an Anti-Reconstruction Supreme Court, 75
NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcomingMar. 2000); John V. Orth, History and the Eleventh
Amendment, 75 NOTREDAMEL. REV. (forthcoming Mar. 2000); James E. Pfander, Once More
unto the Breach: Eleventh Amendment Scholarship and the Court, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
(forthcomingMar. 2000); Suzanna Sherry, States Are People Too, 75 NOTREDAME L. REV.
(forthcoming Mar. 2000); Jay Tidmarsh, A Dialogic Defense of Alden, 75 NoTRE DAMEL. REV.
(forthcoming Mar. 2000); Carlos Manuel Vdzquez, Eleventh Amendment Schizophrenia, 75
NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming Mar. 2000); Michael Wells, Suing States for Money:
Constitutional Remedies After Alden and Florida Prepaid, 31 RUTGERSL.J. (forthcoming Apr.
2000); Ann Woolhandler, Old Property, New Property, and Sovereign Immunity, 75 NoTRE
DAMEL. REV. (forthcoming Mar. 2000).
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EducationExpense Board v. College Savings Bank,4the Courtreaffirmeda
competing principle that may contain the seeds of Alden's substantial
undoing. The Court in Florida Prepaid held that the states' sovereign
immunity is subject to the Due Process Clause, which requires a state to
provide a remedy to individuals when it willfully deprives them of liberty
or propertyin violation of federal law. When propertyor liberty is at stake,
in other words, the rule appearsto be the opposite of what the Courtheld in
Alden: The state is required to provide individuals a remedy in its own
courts.
How far the due process principle undoes the sovereign immunity
principle depends in large part on how the Court defines "liberty" and
"property."A thirddecision handed down that day, College Savings Bank
v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board,' makes it
clear that the concept of "property"is not so capacious as to undoAlden's
sovereign immunityprincipleentirely. College Savings Bank holds that not
all violations of federal statutesthat entitle individuals to damages deprive
individualsof property.But earlierprecedentthat the Courtdid not mention
or purportto disturb indicates that "liberty" and "property," though not
"infinite,"' are "broad and majestic" in scope.7 "In a Constitutionfor a
free people," the Courthas said, " therecan be no doubt that the meaningof
'liberty' must be broadindeed."8 And " [t]he Courthas also made clear that
the property interests protected by procedural due process extend well
beyond actualownershipof real estate, chattels, or money."9 Indeed,under
these precedents,the due process principle appearsto be broad enough to
have required the opposite result in Alden itself, had the principle been
invoked in that case. In other words, Florida Prepaid, in conjunctionwith
extant precedent regarding the meaning of "property," suggests that the
Due Process Clause required Maine to afford Alden the remedy that the
Court in Alden held Maine would otherwise have been entitled to deny on
sovereign immunitygrounds.
The claim that the principlereaffirmedin Florida Prepaid substantially
undoes the principle articulatedin Alden is of course in tension with the
widespreadbelief thatAlden was an importantdecision. The Alden majority
itself at one point sought to downplay the practical significance of its

4. 119 S. Ct. 2199 (1999) [hereinafter
referredto in the text as FloridaPrepaid].
5. 119 S. Ct. 2219 (1999) [hereinafterreferredto in the text as College Savings Bank].
College Savings Bank and Florida Prepaid originated as a single case, but the patent claims

involvedin Florida Prepaidwere appealedto the FederalCircuit,while the claims involvedin
College Savings Bank were appealed to the Third Circuit. See Florida Prepaid, 119 S. Ct. at 2203

n.1.
6. Boardof Regentsv. Roth,408 U.S. 564, 570 (1972).
7. Id. at571.
8. Id. at 572.
9. Id. at 571-72.
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holding by pointing to mechanismsleft open for enforcing the federal legal
obligations of the states-mechanisms such as suits againstthe states by the
federal government,10private suits seeking prospective relief,11and private
suits seeking damages from state officials in their individual capacities.12
These mechanisms, not to mention Congress's power to procure state
waivers of immunity through its spending power, diminish the practical
importance of Alden's holding that private damages actions against the
states are unavailablein state as well as federal courts. But the majority's
stated reasons for unconcern did not include the Due Process Clause's
guarantee of a remedy against the states in certain cases. The claim that
Florida Prepaid largely undoes Alden is also inconsistent with the
apocalyptic nature of the remarksof the dissenting Justices, both in their
opinions and from the bench. This Essay suggests that, if Alden is
significant, its significance may lie in the changes that it portendsfor due
process doctrine. If, under current understandings of " liberty" and
"property," the due process principle largely undoes the sovereign
immunity principle,Alden's strong articulationof the sovereign immunity
principlemay reflect a repudiationof those understandings.
It is possible that the Court's decision in Alden reflects neither its
conscious articulationof an insignificant sovereign immunityprinciplenor
its intention to repudiatedue process doctrine that would otherwise render
its holding insignificant. A third possibility is that the Court decided these
cases without fully working through the implications of its decision for
collateral doctrine, even doctrine implicated in decisions handed down the
same day.'3 If that is what happened, this failure to work through the
10. See Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2267 (1999). The EleventhAmendmentdoes not
protectthe statesfromsuitsin federalcourtbroughtby the federalgovernment.See Principalityof
Monacov. Mississippi,292 U.S. 313, 328-29 (1934).
11. See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2267; Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). On the distinction
between prospectiveand retrospectiverelief, see generallyCarlosManuelVdzquez,Night and
Day: Coeurd'Alene, Breard,and the Unravelingof the Prospective-Retrospective
Distinctionin
EleventhAmendment
Doctrine,87 GEO.L.J. 1 (1998).
12. See Alden,119 S. Ct. at 2267-68;Scheuerv. Rhodes,416 U.S. 232 (1974).
13. Thatthe Courtdid not thinkthroughits analysisof "property"in College SavingsBank
withits usualrigoris suggestedby the fact thatmuchof this portionof its opinionappearsto have
been liftedfromthe SolicitorGeneral'sbriefin the case, which "conceded"thatthe bankhad not
been deprived of a property interest. Compare College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid
PostsecondaryEduc.ExpenseBd., 119 S. Ct. 2219, 2224 (1999) (statingthatthe "hallmark"of a
propertyinterestis the right to exclude others),and id. (stating that trademarksare property
because others may be excluded from infringingthem), and id. at 2225 (finding that the
"misrepresentations
concerningits own productsintrudedupon no interestover which petitioner
had exclusive dominion"),withBrief for the UnitedStatesas Petitioner,College Sav. Bank(No.
98-149), availablein 1999 WL 95503, at *31-32 (describingpropertyas a bundleof rightswith
the most importantbeing the rightto exclude),and id. at *32 (statingthat trademarksand other
intellectualpropertyare propertybecausethey includethe rightto exclude),and id. (statingthat
"misrepresentations
concerningits own productseffected no intrusionupon any tangible or
intangibleinterestover which [College Savings Bank] possesses exclusive dominion").If the
decision in College SavingsBankdoes in fact signal the demise of the Court's"new property"
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ramificationsof one case for anothermay have been caused in part by the
fact that (1) the three cases were briefed and argued separatelyby different
lawyers, (2) each of the opinions in the trilogy was assigned to a different
Justice, and (3) perhaps most importantly,the litigants in Alden failed to
invoke the due process principle.
Part I of this Essay examines what Alden tells us about the nature of
state sovereign immunity. I conclude that the Court rejected the "forumallocation" interpretationof the Eleventh Amendment, and implicitly
adopted what I have called the "immunity-from-liability"interpretation,
underwhich the states are immunefrom being subjectedto damage liability
to individuals."4College Savings Bank confirms that this is how the Court
now understandsstate sovereign immunity. Part II discusses the nature of
the due process principle reaffirmed in Florida Prepaid. I conclude that,
although the due process regime contemplated in Florida Prepaid for
remedying violations of liberty and property may differ from the forumallocation regime in nontrivial ways, it is fair to characterize Florida
Prepaid as a partialresurrectionof the forum-allocationregime. Finally, I
consider in Part III the extent to which last Term's decisions, primarily
College Savings Bank, retreatfrom the broad definition of propertythat the
Court had articulatedin earlier cases. The Court's approachto propertyin
College Savings Bank clearly reflects a change from its approachin past
cases, but just how far the Court has retreatedremains unclear, primarily
because the reasons the Court gave for its conclusion that the College
Savings Bank plaintiff was not suing to enforce a property interest were
unpersuasiveand internallyinconsistent.
If last Term's decisions do signal a dramaticnarrowingof the scope
of the property and liberty protected by the Due Process Clause, they
show that the sovereign immunity tail is beginning to wag a very large
due process dog. To accommodateits holdings denying individuals certain
remedies against states, the Court may have substantially narrowed
concepts that trigger very basic proceduralrights. If these decisions do not
reflect a conscious decision to move due process doctrine in this direction,
the decisions' principal legacy may be a far more complex, and far less
coherent, sovereign immunity and due process doctrine. Although
it is ironicthatthe deathknell has been soundedin a case in whichthe government
jurisprudence,
"conceded"the point, as the point was also concededin the case most closely associatedwith
"new" property,Goldbergv, Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). See infra note 171 and accompanying
text. (I have placed quotation marks around the term "conceded" because, while the
government'sposition in Goldbergwas a genuine concession, its position in College Savings
Bankwas not necessarilyone. The federalgovernmenthad an interestin havingthe LanhamAct
upheld,butit also hadan interestin narrowingthe circumstancesin whichit wouldbe requiredto
providedue process.)
14. See Carlos Manuel Vazquez, What Is Eleventh Amendment Immunity?, 106 YALE L.J.

1683, 1700-08 (1997) (describing the "forum-allocation"and "immunity-from-liability"
interpretations).
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sovereign immunity doctrine has often been criticized as inconsistent with
rule-of-law aspirationsbecause it leaves some rights without corresponding
remedies, the Court's latest decisions suggest that this doctrine's most
problematicfeature from a rule-of-law perspective may be its bewildering
complexity.
I. ALDEN AND THE ADOPTION OF THE IMMUNITY-FROM-LIABILITYVIEW
In Hans v. Louisiana,15 the Court held that the Eleventh Amendment
protects states from being sued in federal court even for violations of
federal obligations. The holding has been controversialbecause of the ruleof-law problem it appears to create."6The Eleventh Amendment, so
interpreted,appearsto violate two related requirementsof the rule-of-law
ideal: that there be a legal remedy for the violation of a legal right,17
and that the judicial power be coextensive with the legislative.18 The
Constitution imposes numerous legal obligations on the states and
gives Congress the power to impose additional ones, but the Eleventh
Amendment,as interpretedin Hans, protects the states from being sued by
privateparties in the federal courts for violating such obligations. Scholars
and dissenting Justiceshave arguedthat the Eleventh Amendment,properly
construed, limits Article III's diversity grants of jurisdiction insofar as
they confer jurisdiction in certain suits against states, but does not limit
the grant of federal-questionjurisdiction,19and that Hans was accordingly
wrongly decided. If so interpreted,the Eleventh Amendment would be
unproblematic from a rule-of-law perspective. The Court came close
to overruling Hans in Welch v. Texas Department of Highways & Public
Transportation,20 and in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas21 it arguably did
15.
16.
17.
18.

134 U.S. 1, 15 (1890).
See Vdzquez,supranote 14, at 1686.
See Marburyv. Madison,5 U.S. (1 Cranch)137, 163 (1803).
See Osbornv. Bank of the United States,22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)738, 818-19 (1824); THE
FEDERALISTNo. 81, at 451-52 (AlexanderHamilton)(ClintonRossitered., 1999).
19. This is the so-calleddiversityinterpretation
of the EleventhAmendment.See Welch v.
Texas Dep't of Highways& Pub.Transp.,483 U.S. 468, 497-98 (1987) (Brennan,J., dissenting);
AtascaderoState Hosp. v. Scanlon,473 U.S. 234, 301 (1985) (Brennan,J., dissenting);Akhil
Reed Amar, Marbury, Section 13, and the Original Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 56 U. CHI.

L. REv. 443, 494-95 (1989); Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALEL.J.
1425, 1475-84 (1987); William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh
Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a
Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REv. 1033 (1983); John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh
Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM.L. REv. 1889, 2004
(1983); Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign
Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1, 4 (1988); James E. Pfander,History and State Suability: An
"Explanatory" Account of the Eleventh Amendment, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 1269, 1273 (1998).

20. 483 U.S. 468 (1987). The Court,with Justice Scalia reservingjudgment,was evenly
dividedon whetherto embracethe diversityinterpretation.
21. 491 U.S. 1 (1989) (Brennan,J., pluralityopinion).

1932

The Yale Law Journal

[Vol. 109: 1927

overrule Hans, for all practicalpurposes,22when it held that Congress has
the power to abrogateEleventh Amendmentimmunitypursuantto Article I.
But the Court emphatically reaffirmed Hans three Terms ago when it
overruled Union Gas in Seminole Tribe v. Florida.23According to the
majority in Seminole Tribe, Congress has the power to abrogateEleventh
Amendmentimmunitypursuantto Section 5 of the FourteenthAmendment,
but not pursuantto " antecedentprovisions of the Constitution."24
Until the past Term, a different line of cases promised a different, but
nearly as satisfying, escape from the rule-of-law problems posed by Hans.
Relying on Cohens v. Virginia,25 in which the SupremeCourtheld that the
Eleventh Amendment does not limit the Supreme Court's appellate
jurisdictionover cases against states litigated in the state courts, even if the
state did not consent to federal review, scholars had read the Court's
Eleventh Amendment cases as establishing that the amendment grants
merely an immunity from the original jurisdiction of the federal courts.26
On this view, which had become known as the "forum-allocation"view,
neither the Eleventh Amendmentnor any other principleof state sovereign
immunity having constitutionalstaturehas any bearing on the remedies to
which states are subject if they violate federal law. The Eleventh
Amendment protects states from suits in federal court by private parties
seeking certain types of remedies, but that just means that persons
aggrieved by state violations of federal law must seek those remedies in
state courts. Under the Supremacy Clause, the state courts must entertain
suits seeking such remedies, and if they fail to afford the remedy required
by federal law (a matter unaffected by sovereign immunity under this
theory), the U.S. SupremeCourtmay reverse theirjudgments.

22. In an apparentattemptto garnerJusticeWhite'svote, JusticeBrennan'spluralityopinion
did not rely on the diversitytheory.Instead,in relianceon Pardenv. TerminalRailway,377 U.S.
184 (1964), the pluralityconcludedthatthe statesconsentedto congressionalabrogationof their
sovereignimmunityunderArticleI when theyjoined the Union. See UnionGas, 491 U.S. at 1415 (Brennan,J., pluralityopinion).For an explanationof how this holdingguttedHans, see id. at
35-42 (Scalia,J., concurringin partanddissentingin part);andVazquez,supranote 14, at 169899. JusticeWhite voted with the plurality,but he did not join the pluralityopinion.Instead,he
wrotecrypticallythat,while he agreedwith the plurality'sconclusion,he did not agreewith all of
its reasoning.See UnionGas, 491 U.S. at 45 (White,J., concurringin partanddissentingin part).
In lateroverrulingUnionGas, the Courtreliedin parton the absenceof a statedrationalethatthe
majorityof the Courtagreedupon.See SeminoleTribev. Florida,517 U.S. 44, 63 (1996).
23. 517 U.S.44.
24. Id. at 66 (quotingUnionGas, 491 U.S. at 42 (Scalia,J., concurringin partanddissenting
in part)).
25. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.)264, 392 (1821).
26. See Jackson,supra note 19, at 15. Accordingto ProfessorJackson,even the forumallocationinterpretation
is too broad.See id. at 74. In herview, the EleventhAmendment'sforumallocationfunction should be understoodas a rule of federal common law, alterableby the
Congress.See id. at 74-75.
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The Supreme Court appearedto embrace this theory in three cases. In
McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco,27the Court
unanimously reaffirmed the holding of Cohens that the Eleventh
Amendmentdoes not limit the Supreme Court's appellatejurisdiction over
suits brought against the states in state courts, even if the state does not
consent to SupremeCourtreview. The Court in McKesson held in addition
that the Due Process Clause sometimes requires the states to afford
remedies in their own courts that the Eleventh Amendmentwould preclude
the federal courts from awarding,28and in Reich v. Collins,29 the Court,
unanimously again, made it clear that when the Due Process Clause
requiresthe remedy, the SupremacyClause vitiates any claim of sovereign
immunity in the state courts. Finally, in Hilton v. South Carolina Public
Railways Commission,30a majority of the Court affirmed that the Federal
Employers' Liability Act (FELA)31subjects states to monetary liability
even though the Eleventh Amendmentprotects states from private damage
suits in federal court under that statute. The Court said that "the Eleventh
Amendment does not apply in state courts,"32and that when "a federal
statutedoes impose liability upon the States, the SupremacyClause makes
that statutethe law in every State, fully enforceablein state court."33
In Alden, however, the Court directly addressed the forum-allocation
view and definitively rejected it.34The plaintiffs, employees of the State
of Maine, claimed that the state had violated their federally guaranteed
right to a minimum wage.35Congress had made it clear in amendments
to the Fair Labor StandardsAct that states not only were requiredto pay
the minimum wage, but also could be sued by employees in federal
and state courts for alleged violations.36The plaintiffs had brought suit
in federal court before the Court decided in Seminole Tribe that Congress
lacked the power to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity pursuant
to its Article I powers. Soon after the Seminole Tribe decision, the
district court dismissed the lawsuit, concluding that Congress had enacted
the FLSA under its Commerce Clause Power,37and the court of appeals
27. 496 U.S. 18, 26-27 (1990). This holdingwas reaffirmedunanimouslylast Termin South
Central Bell Telephone Co. v. Alabama, 119 S. Ct. 1180 (1999).
28. See McKesson, 496 U.S. at 31.

29. 513 U.S. 106, 109-13(1994).
30. 502 U.S. 197, 207 (1991).
31. 45 U.S.C. ?? 51-60 (1994).
32. Hilton,502 U.S. at 205 (quotingWill v. MichiganDep't of StatePolice, 491 U.S. 58, 6364 (1989)).
33. Id. at 207.
34. See Aldenv. Maine,119 S. Ct. 2240, 2260-62 (1999).
35. See id. at 2246.

36. See FairLaborStandardsAmendmentsof 1974,Pub.L. No. 93-259, 88 Stat.55 (codified
as amendedin scatteredsectionsof 29 U.S.C.).
37. See Mills v. Maine,No. 92-410-P-H,1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS9985, at *7 (D. Me. July 3,
1996).
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affirmed.38The employees then broughtthe same suit in state court, arguing
that the Eleventh Amendmentprotected the state only from being sued in
federal court, and that the SupremacyClause requiredthe state to entertain
the congressionally created cause of action and to afford the
congressionally created remedy of backpay, notwithstandingthe sovereign
immunityit would otherwiseenjoy.39The state moved to dismiss the suit on
the ground that, under Maine law, the state is immune from this sort of
action.40The Maine trial court dismissed the lawsuit on sovereign immunity
grounds,41and a divided Maine SupremeJudicialCourtaffirmed.42
The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed, with the same four Justices
dissenting as in Seminole Tribe.43Contrary to some of the commentary
immediately following the decision,' Alden does not call into question the
validity of primaryobligations imposed by Congress on states. The Court
noted, and even relied on, its prior holding that the FLSA is "binding" on
the states even though states remain immune from "private suit to recover
under that Act."45The fact that the states enjoy sovereign immunity, the
Court stressed, "does not confer upon [them] a concomitant right to
disregard the Constitution or valid federal law."46 Indeed, one of the
Court's principal points was that the existence of a valid "substantive
federal law"-by which the Court evidently meant a law that validly
imposes primary obligations on the states-does not vitiate a claim of
sovereign immunity.47" [T]he question is not the primacy of federal law but
the implementationof the law in a mannerconsistent with the constitutional
sovereignty of the States."48Thus, the states remain obligated to pay the

38. See Mills v. Maine,118 F.3d 37, 55 (1st Cir. 1997).
39. See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2246.
40. See id.
41. See id.

42. See Alden v. State, 1998 Me. 200, ? 11. A majorityof fourjustices agreedthatthe state
was protectedby its sovereignimmunity,see id. ? 1, while two dissenterswould have held that
the FLSApreemptedany claimof sovereignimmunityby virtueof the SupremacyClause,see id.
?14.
43. CompareAlden, 119 S. Ct. at 2269 (dissentingopinions),with SeminoleTribev. Florida,
517 U.S. 44, 76, 100 (1996) (dissentingopinions).
44. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Permission To Litigate: Sovereign Immunity Lets States
Decide Who Can Sue Them, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1999, at 42; The Supreme Court: Activism in
DifferentRobes,ECONOMIST,
July 3, 1999, at 22.

45. Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2255 (citing Employeesof Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v.
Departmentof Pub.Health& Welfare,411 U.S. 279, 283 (1973)).
46. Id. at 2266.
47. Id. at 2255.
48. Id. at 2255-56.
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minimum wage.49Sovereign immunity merely bars certain (but not all)
means of enforcing this obligation.50
If the states' sovereign immunityis fully compatiblewith congressional
imposition of primary obligations on states, from what exactly does this
immunity protect states? Under the forum-allocation view, sovereign
immunity protects states only from the original jurisdiction of the federal
courts. Congress retains the power to impose primaryobligations on states
and to subject them to private damage liability to individuals injured by
violations. State courts are in turn obligated by the Supremacy Clause to
entertain such actions. The Court in Alden clearly rejected that theory.
Although it is less clear from the Alden opinion that it adoptedwhat I have
called the immunity-from-liabilityview, the opinion is susceptible to such
an interpretation,and College Savings Bank confirms that the Court now
adheresto the imrmunity-from-liability
view.51
Under the immunity-from-liabilityview, Congress lacks the power to
subject states to damage liability to individuals for violations of federal
statutes. The federal obligations of the states may still be enforced
prospectively in private suits against individual officers, and state officers
may be liable to individualsfor damages in their individualcapacities,52but
the states themselves may not be subjectedto such liability. The majorityin
Alden never declared that the states were free from liability to individuals.
Instead, it purportedto hold only "that the States retain immunityfrom
private suit in their own courts."53At a number of points in the majority
opinion, the Court described another possible immunity of states-a
broaderimmunityfrom "Congress' power to subject States to privatesuits"
regardlessof the forum.54Although in the end, it did not expressly adoptthe
latter interpretationof state sovereign immunity, some of the support it
cited for its holding would supportthis broaderinterpretationas well.55But
49. The Constitutiondoes limit the federalgovernment'spowerto imposeobligationson the
states,see Printzv. UnitedStates,521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997);New Yorkv. UnitedStates,505 U.S.
144, 162 (1992), but the sovereignimmunitycases do not concernthis sortof limit.
50. See infratext accompanyingnote 80. In this respect,the Court'smorerecentdecisionin
Kimel v. Board of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631 (2000), offers a strikingcontrast.As has become
customary,the Courtnotedat the end of its opinionthatits holdingdoes not leave personsin the
plaintiffs'positionentirelywithouta remedy.See id. at 650. See generallyVdzquez,supranote 3
(giving examplesof similarstatementsin past decisions). But, ratherthan emphasizethat the
federalobligationsimposedby the Age Discriminationin EmploymentAct (ADEA),29 U.S.C.A.
?? 621-634 (West Supp. 1999), remainedbindingon statesandenforceableagainstthem in suits
by the federalgovernmentor in privatesuits againststateofficialsfor prospectiverelief,the Court
in Kimel merely noted that state laws protectstate employees against age discrimination.See
Kimel,120 S. Ct. at 650.
51. See infratext accompanyingnotes 82-93.
52. On these alternativemechanismsfor enforcingthe federalobligationsof the states, see
generallyVdzquez,supranote 3.
53. Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2266 (emphasisadded).
54. Id. at 2259.
55. See infranotes65-68 andaccompanyingtext.
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even in this broader articulation,the Court described the immunity as an
immunityfrom " suits," not an immunityfrom liability as such.
Is the Court's holding nevertheless necessarily a holding that states are
immune from congressionally imposed liability to individuals?In the light
of its earlier holding that states are immune from private damage suits in
federal court for violation of statutesenacted under Article I, is its holding
in Alden that states are also entitled to immunity from such suits in their
own courts tantamountto a holding that states are immune from private
damage liability? There appear to be two possible ways to escape this
conclusion. First,the Courtdid not expressly overruleits holding in Nevada
v. Hall56that states do not enjoy any constitutionalimmunity from suits in
the courts of sister states. In the light of Hall, the narrowholding that states
are immune from congressionallyimposed private suits in their own courts
would in theory be consistent with the existence of a federal liability that
could be enforced against the states without their consent in the courts of
sister states.57This possibility would appearto be excluded by the broader
view-not expressly embraced in Alden-that the states' immunity is an
immunity from being subjected by Congress to private damage suits "in
any forum."58 But even underthis broaderformulation,accordingto Alden,
states are immune only from " suits.""At least in theory, they may remain
subjectto privatedamage liability. I shall discuss in turnthese two possible
ways to escape the conclusion that, after Alden, states are immune from
federally imposed damage liability to individuals.
In Hall, the Californiacourts entertainedan action against the State of
Nevada based on Californialaw and refused to give effect to a Nevada law
protectingthe state from liability beyond a certainamount.59The Courtheld
that nothing in the federal Constitutionprotected Nevada from such a suit
or required California to recognize Nevada's law concerning sovereign
immunity.60Hall thus leaves open the possibility that the states' federal
obligations may be enforced against them throughprivatesuits in the courts
56. 440 U.S. 410 (1979).
57. Becausestatesmay not discriminateagainstclaimsbasedon federallaw, see McKnettv.
St. L. & S.F. Ry., 292 U.S. 230, 234 (1934), if statesareindeedsubjectto suchliability,thenstate
courtsmay be constitutionallyrequiredto entertainsuits againstsisterstatesbasedon federallaw
if they entertainsuits against sister states based on analogousstate laws. The "valid excuse"
exception,however,wouldappearto permitstatesto deny theirown courtsjurisdictionover suits
againstsisterstatesbasedon federallaw even if they consentto suits againstthemselvesbasedon
the samefederallaw. See Howlettv. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 369 (1990) (quotingDouglasv. New Y.,
N.H. & H.R. Co., 279 U.S. 377, 387-88 (1929)); cf Jackson,Principleand Compromise,supra
note 3 (suggestingthatAlden means that states can insist on sovereignimmunityin their own
courtsin suits based on federallaw even if they have consentedto analogousstate-lawclaims);
infranote 68 (suggestingthatHall may permitsuits againstsisterstatesonly if stateswaive their
own immunityfromsimilarsuits).
58. Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2262.
59. See Hall, 440 U.S. at 412-13.
60. See id. at 426.
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of sister states. Indeed, if State A does subject State B to private damage
suits for violation of federal law, State B may be requiredunder the Full
Faith and Credit Clause to enforce State A's judgment against it.6"Alden
could be interpreted to hold otherwise,62 but the Court in Alden
distinguishedReich v. Collins as a suit in which the "obligation arises from
the Constitution itself' and did not involve "the power of Congress to
subject States to suits in their own courts."63 The Court could thus
conceivably hold that just as the states' entitlementto sovereign immunity
in their own courts is subject to the remedial requirementsof the Due
Process Clause, so too is it subjectto the Full Faith and CreditClause.
Although Hall does leave open this mechanism for enforcing a
federally created liability of the states, I shall not dwell on this possible
ground for concluding that the Court did not embrace the immunity-fromliability view. First, Alden itself suggests that Hall may not survive long.
Although the Court in the end phrased its holding narrowly (apparently
because of 'Hall), some of the support it cited for its holding is as
inconsistent with Hall as with the position urged by the plaintiffs in the
case. For example, the Court relied on a number of cases making the
"sweeping" statement that states cannot be sued by individuals without
their consent.' It also relied on its statementin Beers v. Arkansasthat "[i]t
is an established principle of jurisprudencein all civilized nations that the
sovereign cannot be sued in its own courts, or in any other, without its
consent and permission."6 Even more to the point was its quotationfrom
Cunninghamv. Macon & BrunswickRailroad that " [i]t may be accepted as
a point of departureunquestioned,that neither a State nor the United States
can be sued as defendant in any court in this country without their
consent."66 Finally, the Court stressed " 'the indignity of subjectinga State
to the coercive process of judicial tribunals at the instance of private
parties,' regardless of the forum."67 These passages suggest that the
constitutionalimmunityrecognized in Alden protectsstates from being sued
in the courtsof sister states without theirconsent.68
61. See U.S. CONST.
art.IV, ? 1.
62. See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2266 (" [W]e hold that the Statesretainimmunityfrom private
suit in theirown courts....").
63. Id. at 2259. As discussedfurtherbelow, the Reich case, and indeedthe Court'sdecision
the same day in Florida Prepaid, do appearto be cases in which, in a sense, Congress is
subjectingstatesto suit in theirown courts.See infranotes 136-139andaccompanyingtext.
64. See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2262 (citing GreatNorthernLife Ins. Co. v. Read,322 U.S. 47,
51 (1944);In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 506 (1887);Boardof Liquidationv. McComb,92 U.S. 531,
541 (1876);Briscoev. Bankof Ky., 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 257, 321-22 (1837)).
65. Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2262 (quotingBeersv. Arkansas,61 U.S. (20 How.) 527, 529 (1858))
(emphasisadded).
66. Id. (quotingCunninghamv. Macon& B.R., 109 U.S. 446,451 (1883)) (emphasisadded).
67. Id. at 2264 (quotingAyers,123 U.S. at 505) (citationsomitted)(emphasisadded).
68. Moreover,if sisterstates were requiredto enforcein theirown courtsprivatejudgments
obtainedagainstthem in the courtsof sister states,Hall would also appearto conflict with the
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Second, Alden would be consistent with the immunity-from-liability
view even if the Court did not overruleHall or hold that the Full Faith and
CreditClause does not extend to suits to enforce a sister-statejudgment in a
state's own courts. Hall leaves open a private remedy against states for
violations of federal law, but the remedy would exist if and only if a sister
state recognized it. A remedy that exists only by virtue of its recognitionby
another state would appear to be a state remedy, not a federal remedy. A
suit under Hall seeking a remedy for the violation of federal law does not
seek to enforce a liability "imposed" by federal law. Even under the
broadest interpretationof Hall, therefore, states could still be said to be
immune fromfederal damage liability to individuals.69
To be sure, my rejection of this first rationale for denying that Alden
embraces the immunity-from-liability view depends on a particular
conception of what it means to be undera legal liability. A second possible
way to reconcile Alden with the existence of a congressionally imposed
liability of states to individuals would be simply to deny that the existence
of a federal " liability" requiresthe availability of a compulsive " suit" to
enforce the liability. For example, it is recognized that nations may be
"responsible" to other nations for their violations of internationallaw even
though no judicial forum exists in which the injuredstate may maintainan
action against the responsible state without the latter's consent. Justice
Holmes said in The WesternMaid that " legall obligations that exist but
cannot be enforced are ghosts that are seen in the law but that are elusive to
the grasp."70Perhaps the federal liability exists in the ghostly fashion
described by Holmes even though the states' sovereign immunity prevents
its enforcement without the states' consent. The care taken by the Alden

Alden Court'semphasison the importanceof allowingstatesto controltheirown treasuries.See
Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2264. Congresscould expose all statetreasuriesto private"raids"merelyby
persuadinga single state of the wisdom of the federalpolicy. Cf id. at 2250 (quotingDAVIDP.
CURRIE,THECONSTITUTION
IN CONGRESS:
THEFEDERALIST
PERIOD1789-1801, at 196 (1997))

(expressing concern about private raids on state treasuries);United States Supreme Court
Transcript,
Alden(No. 98-436), availablein 1999 WL 216178, at *21-22 (same).Congressmight
even be able to achieve this goal withoutpersuadingany state of the wisdom of the federal
policy-for example,by offeringa statefederalmoneyif it agreesto subjectitself andsisterstates
to privatedamagesuits in its courts.(The Courtin Hall notedthatCaliforniahad "unequivocally
waived its own immunityfrom liability for the torts" to which it was subjectingNevada,
suggestingthat a state would not be free to preserveits own immunitywhile subjectingsister
states to liabilityon the same cause of action. See Nevadav. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 424 (1979).)
Since statesarenot personsfor purposesof the Due ProcessClause,see Republicof Argentinav.
Weltover,Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 619 (1992); SouthCarolinav. Katzenbach,383 U.S. 301, 323-24
(1966), a statecould apparentlyauthorizeits courtsto entertainsuits againstsisterstateswithout
regard to the existence of "minimum contacts." See generally InternationalShoe Co. v.
Washington,326 U.S. 310 (1945). Nor would the dormantCommerceClausepose an obstacle,
since by hypothesisCongresswill have "authorized"any suchburdenon interstatecommerce.
69. This is why I have never regardedHall as inconsistentwith the immunity-from-liability
theory.See Vdzquez,supranote 14, at 1700n.77, 1711n.131.
70. 257 U.S. 419, 433 (1922).
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Court not to characterizeits holding as an immunityfrom liability suggests
thatthe majoritymay have viewed it that way.
But I doubt that even Holmes would regard such obligations as legal
ones.7"In any event, it appearsthat the Framerswould not have regardedan
obligation of a state that cannot be enforced without the state's consent as a
legal one. The Framersdistinguisheda law from a "mere treaty" in that the
latter depended for its efficacy on the good faith of the parties.72The
statementsby Hamiltonand others relied on by the Courtin Hans and later
in Seminole Tribe equate the existence of sovereign immunity with the
absence of a right of action-indeed, the absence of a primarylegal duty.73
For example, Hamiltonwrote in The Federalist No. 81 that
there is no color to pretend that the State governments would, by
adoption of [the Constitution], be divested of the privilege of
paying theirown debts in their own way, free from every constraint
but that which flows from the obligations of good faith. The
contractsbetween a nation and individuals are only binding on the
conscience of the sovereign, and have no pretensions to a
compulsive force. They confer no right of action independentof the
sovereign will.74
Because of the states' immunity, individuals had no "right of action"
against the states. Because the states' contractsdepended for their efficacy
on the states' good faith, they lacked "compulsive force." In other words,
they did not create legal obligations at all.75
If anything emerges with clarity from the convention and ratification
debates, it is that the Framersdid not rely on the states' good faith to secure
the efficacy of the federal obligations of the states. Such reliance was,
indeed, the chief problem with the Articles of Confederation and the
principalreason the Framersdecided to write a new constitution:
There was a time when we were told that breachesby the States of
the regulationsof the federal authoritywere not to be expected; that
a sense of common interest would preside over the conduct of the

71. The statement,after all, appearsin an opinion concludingthat a ship that negligently
causedanothership injurywhile being operatedby the sovereigndid not incurany liabilityas a
result.
72. THEFEDERALIST
No. 33, supra note 18, at 172 (AlexanderHamilton).
73. See also Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261 (1997); Blatchfordv. Native
Village,501 U.S. 775 (1991);Principalityof Monacov. Mississippi,292 U.S. 313 (1934).
74. THEFEDERALIST
No. 81, supranote 18, at 456 (AlexanderHamilton).
75. See Hamilton'sstatementin TheFederalistNo. 33 thata "meretreaty,"unlikea law, is
"dependenton the good faithof the parties,"id. at 172, and GouverneurMorris'sstatementthat,
unlike "a mere compact resting on the good faith of the parties," a "national, supreme,
Govt.... [has] a compleat and compulsiveoperation," 1 THERECORDSOF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION
OF 1787, at 34 (MaxFarrand
ed., 1966).
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respective members,and would beget a full compliance with all the
constitutional requisitions of the Union. This language, at the
present day, would appearas wild as a great part of what we now
hear from the same quarterwill be thought, when we shall have
received further lessons from that best oracle of wisdom,
experience. It at all times betrayedan ignoranceof the true springs
by which human conduct is actuated, and belied the original
inducements to the establishment of civil power. Why has
governmentbeen institutedat all? Because the passions of men will
not conform to the dictates of reason and justice without
constraint.76

This history is difficult to square with one of the reasons the Alden
Courtgave in supportof its holding:
We are unwilling to assume the States will refuse to honor the
Constitution or obey the binding laws of the United States. The
good faith of the States thus provides an importantassurancethat
" [t]his Constitution,and the Laws of the United States which shall
be made in Pursuancethereof .., shall be the supreme Law of the
Land."77

The Court's invocation of "good faith" as a mechanism for securing
the status of the states' federal obligations as "Law of the Land" offers
some basis for thinking that the Court regardedthe states as being under a
federal legal liability to individuals even though their sovereign immunity
precludedthe enforcementof this liability without their consent.78But this
76. THEFEDERALIST
No. 15, supra note 18, at 78 (AlexanderHamilton).For additional
citations,see CarlosManuelVdzquez, Treaty-BasedRights and Remedies of Individuals,92
COLUM.
L. REV.1082, 1097-101(1992).
77. Aldenv. Maine,119 S. Ct. 2240, 2266 (1999) (quotingU.S. CONST.
art.VI).
78. The Court'sfailureto overruleits decision in Hilton may offer furthersupportfor this
view. As noted above, the Court in Hilton held that FELA did subject states to "monetary
liability" to individuals.See Hilton v. South CarolinaPub. Rys. Comm'n,502 U.S. 197, 207
(1991). In Alden, the CourtinterpretedHilton as having turnedon the states' consent to being
sued in theirown courtsunderFELA.See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2258. If the Courtembracesboth
views, thenperhapsit does believe thatstatescan be said to be subjectto a federallegal liability,
even if that liabilitycan be enforcedagainstthem only if they consent.Cf Vdzquez,supranote
14, at 1788-89(anticipatingtheAldenholdingandsuggestingthatthe Courtmightreconcilesuch
a holdingwith Hiltonby denyingthata legal obligationmustbe enforceablewithoutconsent,but
rejectingthatpositionas incompatiblewith the Framers'view of law). ButAldenappearsto reject
at least some aspects of the Court'sanalysis in Hilton. For example, the Courtin Hilton had
viewed the issue before it as whetherstates were entitledto "immunityfrom state-courtsuit"
underFELA,502 U.S. at 203, andit held thatthey werenot entitledto such immunity,statingthat
"when ... a federalstatutedoes imposea liabilityon the States,the SupremacyClausemakesthat
statutethe law in every State,fully enforceablein statecourt,"id. at 207. Aldenholds thatstates
are entitledto immunityfrom state-courtsuit understatuteslike FELA,and hence such statutes
arenot "fully enforceable"againstthe statesin statecourts.If Aldenrequiresa rejectionof these
aspectsof Hilton,thenthereappearsto be littlereasonto believe thatthe Courtstill adheresto the
notionthatFELAimposes"monetaryliability"on the states.
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invocation is highly problematicprecisely because it conflicts so directly
with the Framers'understandingof what it means for an obligation to have
legal status.
In the end, however, the Court's confidence in the states' good faith
appearsto have played a negligible role in its analysis. The quoted passage
refers to the primaryobligations imposed by federal law on the states, not
the remedial obligations. Although the expected good faith of the states
gave the majority some comfort, the Court went on to recognize that
the efficacy of these obligations does not rest on good faith. The Court
stressed as well that "the plan of the Convention" included mechanisms
for enforcing federal obligations even against recalcitrantstates.79These
mechanisms include suits by the federal government or by sister states
in federal court, suits against state officials by private parties seeking
prospective relief, and suits by private parties seeking damages from state
officials.80The Court concluded that these mechanisms provided sufficient
assurancethat the federal obligations of the states would be effective, while
offering due protection to the states' dignity and their treasuries.8"The
Court's reliance on these compulsory mechanisms to enforce the primary
obligations is consistent with the idea that those obligations are legally
binding on the states (in the Framers'sense) even though the states remain
immune from privatedamageliability underfederal law. On the other hand,
the claim that a liability of states to private individuals exists as a legal
matter even though it cannot be enforced by such individuals without the
states' consent is inconsistentwith the Court'sultimaterecognition(and the
Framers' clear view) that compulsory mechanisms of enforcement are
necessary to give efficacy to legal obligations of states-indeed, to give
such obligations the status of "law." If law is by its nature compulsory,
then a liability that depends on the good faith of those subjectto the norm is
not a legal liability.
AlthoughAlden may be equivocal in this regard,the decision the same
day in College Savings Bank establishes that the Court has embraced
the immunity-from-liabilityview, even if the Court does not yet fully
realize it. College Savings Bank involved the constitutionalityof Congress's
abrogationof Eleventh Amendment immunity in the Lanham Act. Under
Fitzpatrickv. Bitzer,82Congress may abrogatethis immunitypursuantto its
power to enforce the FourteenthAmendment,but under Seminole Tribe, it
may not abrogate pursuantto its Article I powers.83In the Lanham Act,
Congress abrogated the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity on the
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2267.
See id. at 2267-68.
See id. at 2268.
427 U.S. 445,456 (1976).
See SeminoleTribev. Florida,517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996).
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theory that the Act creates property rights that are protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The plaintiff in College
Savings Bank argued that the abrogationwas valid on this theory, but the
argumentfoundered at the first step. The plaintiff was complaining about
the defendant's false advertisingof its own products.The Court held that,
while the Lanham Act may create some rights that count as property for
purposes of the Due Process Clause, such as the rights protected by a
trademark,84
the right that the plaintiff was claiming-the right to be free
from pecuniaryinjurycaused by a competitor'sfalse advertisingof its own
product-is not a propertyright.85
The Court's treatmentof the concept of propertyunderthe Due Process
Clause is the focus of PartIII. For now, the importantpoint is that the Court
completely ignored anotherright thatthe plaintiff was claiming: the right to
damages from the defendant for alleged false advertising.86Congress
clearly purportedto establish such a right in the LanhamAct.87The Court's
precedentsestablish that a chose in action is a propertyright.88A chose in
action is a "right to recover .., money."89The Court's failure to consider
the plaintiff's right to damages is explicable on the theory that Congress
lacked the power to confer such a right. And this, in turn, is explicable
on the theory that, in the light of Alden and Seminole Tribe, sovereign
immunity protects states from being subjected by Congress to damage
liability to individuals.
The other possibility is that a federal liability exists but cannot be
enforced without the state's consent. But if such a "liability" were deemed
a legal one, it would be unclear why the correspondingright to damages
would not count as a propertyright for due process purposes. One answer
may be thateven if a right to damages is a " legal" right, it is not a property
right unless the rightholderalso has the capacity to enforce it in court. An
alternative definition of "chose in action" is a "right of bringing an

84. See College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct.
2219, 2224 (1999).
85. See id. at 2225.
86. See id. at 2224-25.
87. See 15 U.S.C. ? 1122(b) (1994).
88. See, e.g., Richards v. Jefferson County, 517 U.S. 793, 804 (1996) (noting that a "chose in
action" is a "protected property interest in its own right"); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472
U.S. 797, 807 (1985) (" [A] chose in action is a constitutionally recognized property
interest ....").
89. BLACK'SLAW DICTIONARY219 (5th ed. 1979); see also 2 WILLIAMBLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES
*397 ("Thus money due on a bond is a chose in action....");
THOMAS
BLOUNT,NoMo-LExICON:A LAW-DICTIONARY
(London, ThomasNewcomb 1670) ("Chose in
action is a thing incorporeal and onely a right, as an annuity, obligation for Debt ...." ); 1 JOHN
BOUVIER,A LAW DICTIONARY
227 (Philadelphia, Childs & Peterson 1856) (defining chose in
action as a right " to receive or recover a debt, or money, or damages for breach of contract, or for
a tort connected with contract").
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action."90Perhaps the Court would say that the cases recognizing that a
chose in action is propertyuse the term in this second sense and thus merely
restate the well-established principle that a cause of action is a property
right.91Thus, it might be argued,the plaintiff in College Savings Bank had a
legal right to damages but lacked a propertyright because, in the light of
Alden, it lacked the power to bring the state into court. Florida Prepaid,
however, establishes that a person may have a property right against the
state even if sovereign immunity prevents the individual from maintaining
an action for damages against the state without its consent. The Court's
failure even to consider whether the right to damages created by Congress
qualifies as a propertyright, even if it is unenforceablein court, suggests
that the Courtunderstoodits holding in Alden as negating any such right.
That, at any rate, appears to be how the majority in College Savings
Bank understoodits holding, for it expressly describedthe issue in the case
as whether" Congress can make Florida liable to privateparties for false or
misleading advertising."92 Thus, the Court did not consider whether the
rightto damagesthat Congress createdwas a basis for abrogatingthe state's
sovereign immunity on a due process theory, because, in its view, such
liability is exactly what sovereign immunityprotectsthe states from. Thatis
the immunity-from-liabilityview.93

90. BLACK'SLAW DICTIONARY,supra note 89, at 219; see also BLOUNT,supra note 89
[G]enerallyall Causesof Suit for any Debt or Duty, Trespassor Wrong,are to be accounted
Chosesin action.").
91. See, e.g., Tulsa Prof 1 CollectionServs. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 485 (1988) (finding a
propertyright in a cause of action againstan estate for an unpaidbill); Logan v. Zimmerman
Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 429-30 (1982) (finding a propertyright to use the adjudicatory
mechanismof a fair laboract); Mullanev. CentralHanoverBank & Trust,339 U.S. 306, 313
(1950) (defining as propertythe right to have a trustee "answer for negligent or illegal
impairmentsof [one's] interests");In re ConsolidatedUnitedStatesAtmosphericTestingLitig.,
820 F.2d 982, 988-89 (9th Cir. 1987) (acknowledgingthat a cause of action is a "species of
property");ShanghaiPower Co. v. United States, 4 Cl. Ct. 237, 240 (1983) (Kozinski,C.J.)
(findinga propertyrightin a claim for the differencebetweenthe termsof a settlementand the
amountthe plaintiffbelievedthe claimwas worth).
92. College Sav. Bankv. FloridaPrepaidPostsecondaryEduc.ExpenseBd., 119 S. Ct. 2219,
2230 (1999) (emphasisadded).
93. Characterizing
statesovereignimmunityas an immunityfromliabilitymay seem strained
in the light of Congress's apparentpower to establish a system under which the federal
governmentsues to recovermoneyfromstatesthathave violatedfederallaw andturnsthe money
over to the individualsinjuredas a resultof the violation.Can it be said that states are immune
from "liability" under such a regime? I have characterizedstate sovereign immunityas an
("

immunity from liability to individuals, as did the Court in College Savings Bank. But perhaps it

would be moreaccurateto say thatstatesovereignimmunitydenies individualsthe legal rightto
damages,in the sense thatthey lack the capacityto enforceany entitlementto suchdamages.See
generallyVdzquez,supranote 76, at 1089-91.
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II. FLORIDAPREPAID AND THE PARTIAL RESURRECTIONOF THE
FORUM-ALLOCATIONVIEW

On the same day that it adopted the immunity-from-liabilityview in
Alden, the Court appearsto have partiallyresurrectedthe forum-allocation
view with respect to a subset of congressionallyimposed obligations of the
states: those that give rise to correlative "property" rights within the
meaning of the Due Process Clause. Indeed, in some respects, the states'
remedial obligations under the Due Process Clause are broaderthan their
remedial obligations under the forum-allocation view. Under the latter
view, the states would have been required to entertain private damage
actions in their own courts if Congress created a right to damages. Florida
Prepaid appears to hold that, with respect to congressionally created
property rights, states are obligated to provide an adequate remedy to
individualseven if Congress has not created a damages remedy.As long as
Congress has imposed a primaryobligation that gives rise to a "property"
right, the Due Process Clause itself requires the states to provide an
adequateremedy.
The plaintiff in Florida Prepaid was the College Savings Bank, the
same bank that was the plaintiff in College Savings Bank. It alleged that the
defendant,an agency of the State of Florida,had infringedits patentrights,
and it sued for damages in federal court.94The patent laws give the federal
courts exclusive jurisdictionover infringementclaims.95In 1992, Congress
abrogatedthe states' Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal
court.96At that time, the Court had not yet overruled its holding in
Union Gas that Congress possesses the power to abrogate Eleventh
Amendment immunity pursuantto its Article I legislative powers.97But,
perhapsanticipatingUnion Gas's demise, Congressjustified the abrogation
of Eleventh Amendmentimmunity as an "enforcement" of the Fourteenth
Amendment.98Its theory was that patentrights are "property"rights within
the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, and
accordinglyan abrogationof state immunityfrom federaljurisdictionwas a
valid measureto "enforce" the state's obligations underthat clause.99
Florida did not deny that patents were property.Instead, it urged the
Court to hold that Congress lacks the power to abrogate Eleventh
Amendment immunity to "enforce" the states' obligations under the Due
Process Clause with respect to "property"rights createdby Congressunder
94. See FloridaPrepaidPostsecondaryEduc.ExpenseBd. v. College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct.
2199, 2223.

95. See 28 U.S.C. ? 1338 (1994).
96. See 35 U.S.C. ? 296 (1994).
97. The CourtoverruledUnionGas in SeminoleTribev. Florida,517 U.S. 44 (1996).
98. See S. REP.No. 102-280, at 7-8 (1992).
99. See id.; see also Florida Prepaid, 119 S. Ct. at 2208 n.7.
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Article L*1"Allowing Congress to abrogatesovereign immunity to enforce
the states' obligations regarding property rights created under Article I,
Florida argued, would circumvent the holding in Seminole Tribe that
Congress lacks the power to abrogate immunity pursuantto Article JL*0
Rejecting that argument,the Court expressly recognized that Congress has
the power to abrogatesovereign immunityto enforce the states' due process
obligations concerningpropertyrights thatit has createdunderArticle 1.102
But, the Court held, a state deprivationof the plaintiff's propertyright
is not a sufficient predicate for an abrogation of sovereign immunity.
The Court reiterated its holding in City of Boerne v. Flores103 that
Congress's power under Section 5 is "'remedial' in nature,"'
' and said
that an abrogation of sovereign immunity is "appropriate" legislation
under Section 5 only if it is "tailor[ed]. . . to remedying or
preventing... conduct" that "transgress[es]the FourteenthAmendment's
substantive provisions."105 Congress said that it had abrogatedthe states'
Eleventh Amendmentimmunity from patent-infringementsuits to enforce
the Due Process Clause, but that clause, the Court stressed, does not
prohibit deprivations of property; it prohibits such deprivations only if
accomplished "without due process of law." Citing earlier proceduraldue
process decisions, the Court emphasized that a state can sometimes satisfy
its obligation to provide " due process" by providingan adequateremedy in
its own courts.'06 The Court struck down Congress's abrogation of
sovereign immunityfrom patent-infringementclaims for two reasons: First,
Congress lacked sufficient evidence that states were both infringing
federally protected patent rights and failing to provide the "adequate"
remedy requiredby the Due Process Clause; and second, it did not limit the
abrogation to cases involving "unremedied patent infringements by the

States."107
For present purposes,the most interestingaspect of Florida Prepaid is
not its holding that Congress may abrogate sovereign immunity to
"enforce" the guaranteeof proceduraldue process, but ratherits holding
regarding what the Due Process Clause requires in the first place. The
Court's recognition that the Due Process Clause requires the states to
provide an adequateremedy to individualswhen the states "deprive" them

100. See Florida Prepaid, 119 S. Ct. at 2208.
101. In supportof this argument,Floridareliedon Vdzquez,supranote 14, at 1744-46.See
Brief for Petitioners,FloridaPrepaid(No. 98-531), availablein 1999 WL 86846, at *19.
102. See Florida Prepaid, 119 S. Ct. at 2208.

103. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
104. Florida Prepaid, 119 S. Ct. at 2206.

105. Id. at 2207.
106. See id. at 2208-09 (relying on Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113 (1990); Hudson v.
Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984); and Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981)).

107. Id. at 2207 (emphasisadded).
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of propertyrights created by Congress threatensa substantialresurrection
of the forum-allocationview.
The resurrectionis incomplete for two reasons. First, it applies only to
"property" and "liberty" rights. The opinion in College Savings Bank
makes it clear that not all federally imposed obligations are "property"
rights. The Court did not say anything about liberty, but presumablythe
Court does not regard all federal rights as liberty for purposes of the Due
Process Clause. The present contours of the concept of "property"are the
principal subject of Part III. Second, the Due Process Clause requires a
remedy only when the state has ""deprived"people of propertyrights. The
Court in Florida Prepaid stressed that a "deprivation"occurs only when
the state acts intentionally.108
Neither Florida Prepaid nor the decisions on
which it relies offer much guidance about the precise mental state that
produces a "deprivation,"but it is clear that negligent injuries to property
do not implicate the Due Process Clause and thus do not require an
"adequate"remedy.
The opinion in Florida Prepaid also leaves it unclear what an
"adequate" remedy is. It seems clear that the Court is contemplating
monetaryrelief.'09It is also clear that an adequateremedy is less than what
Congress authorized in the patent laws-treble damages and attorneys'
fees."0 But, beyond that, the meaning of "adequacy" is uncertain. It is
possible that an "adequate" remedy under the Due Process Clause is
equivalent to "just compensation"under the Takings Clause,'1'consisting
of compensatorybut not punitive relief. The due process regime thus differs
from the forum-allocationregime in that the remedy requiredby the Due
Process Clause is not necessarily the same as the remedy Congress
specified in the statute.It may be either narroweror broader.'12
Among the other ambiguities that remain after Florida Prepaid is
whether the "adequate" remedy requiredby the Due Process Clause is a
remedy against the state itself or merely its officers. Some of the Court's
proceduraldue process cases suggest that the Due Process Clause entitles
persons deprivedof propertyby the state to a remedy against the state itself.
McKesson, for example, was a case broughtby a taxpayerseeking a refund
from the state on the ground that the state tax was unconstitutional.The
108. See id. at 2209.
109. See id. at 2209 & n.9.
110. See id. at 2209.

111. See U.S. CONST. amend.V.
112. Thatit may be broaderappearsto follow fromthe Court'srejectionof the "bitterwith
the sweet" interpretationof the Due Process Clause advocatedby then-JusticeRehnquist's
pluralityopinionin Arnettv. Kennedy,416 U.S. 134, 152-54(1974), underwhichthe Due Process
Clause would protectonly such proceduresas the legislatureprovidedfor when it createdthe
right. See ClevelandBd. of Educ. v. Loudermill,470 U.S. 532, 541 (1984) (rejectingJustice
Rehnquist's"bitterwith the sweet" theory);Vdzquez,supranote 14, at 1768-70 (discussingthe
Court'srejectionof the "bitterwiththe sweet" theory);infraPartIII.
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state courts agreed that the state tax violated the dormant Commerce
Clause,113but held that full compensatory relief was not required under
Floridalaw.114The SupremeCourtreversed,holding that, if the state denies
taxpayers a predeprivationopportunityto challenge a tax's validity, then
the Due Process Clause requires a postdeprivationhearing and, if the tax
was invalid-and no other remedy would cure the violation-a refund."'
This case and others"6 suggest that the remedy requiredby the Due Process
Clause is a remedy againstthe state.
The Parratt v. Taylor line of proceduraldue process cases, however,
suggests that the Due Process Clause is satisfied as long as the state makes
available a damageremedy againstresponsible state officials. Parratt was a
suit brought by a prisoner under ? 1983"' seeking damages for a state
official's destructionof his hobby kit."8 The prisoner argued that the state
officer was liable under ? 1983 because he had deprivedthe prisonerof his
property without due process. The Court agreed that the hobby kit was
property, but held that, if the deprivation was random and unauthorized,
as it was in that case,119 the state satisfies its obligations under the Due
Process Clause by making availablea postdeprivationremedy.120In Parratt,
Nebraska had made available a postdeprivationremedy against the state
itself,121but subsequentcases indicate that a postdeprivationremedy against
the officer suffices for due process purposes.122
In an earlier article, I suggested that these two lines of due process
cases could be reconciled, and other doctrinal conundrums solved, if
McKesson were interpretedas holding that the remedy requiredby the Due
Process Clause is a remedy against state officials rather than the state

113. See McKessonCorp.v. Division of AlcoholicBeverages& Tobacco,496 U.S. 18, 2526 (1990).
114. See id. at 26.
1 15. See id. at 51-52.

116. See, e.g., Newsweek v. FloridaDep't of Revenue,522 U.S. 442 (1998) (per curiam)
(requiringFloridato providemeaningfulbackward-looking
relief); Reich v. Collins, 513 U.S.
106, 114 (1994) (requiringthe samerelief fromGeorgia).
117. 42 U.S.C. ? 1983 (1994).
118. See Parrattv. Taylor,451 U.S. 527, 530 (1981).
119. The destructionof the hobby kit was alleged to have been negligent. The Courtin
Parrattheld thatsuchnegligentconductcan be a "deprivation"for due processpurposes.See id.
at 534-35. This holdingwas laterreversedin Daniels v. Williams,474 U.S. 327, 330 (1986), but
the Parrattprecedentremainsapplicableto willful conductthatis "randomand unauthorized."
See Zinermonv. Burch,494 U.S. 113, 138 (1990);Hudsonv. Palmer,468 U.S. 517, 534 (1984).
120. See Parratt,451 U.S. at 544.
121. Seeid.atS30.
122. See Hudson, 468 U.S. at 520 n.1; see also Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 115 (citing Court

precedent that a "postdeprivationtort remedy" suffices for random and unauthorized
deprivations); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial Review, and

ConstitutionalRemedies,93 COLUM.
L. REv. 309, 349 (1993) (suggestingthatParrattrequires
federal courts "to develop constitutionalstandardsdefining the scope of various officials'
liabilities");Vdzquez,supranote 14, at 1771-72n.386.
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itself.123As long as a state makes available a remedy against officials, it is
not requiredby the Due Process Clause to entertainsuits against itself. But
if it immunizes its officials from liability, or if it otherwiseburdensthe right
of action against the official-for example, by structuringits tax-collection
system in such a way as to leave it unclear which official is liable-then it
must substitute a suit against the state itself. On this view, the Court in
McKesson and like cases held that the remedy must come from the state
itself because the state had "consented" to the remedy by establishing a
procedurefor obtaining a refund of taxes from the state. The Due Process
Clause would be satisfied, however, by a regime affording meaningful
relief against state officials.
The decision in Florida Prepaid provides slight additional supportfor
the officer-liability interpretationof McKesson. The Court in Florida
Prepaid stressed that the Due Process Clause is implicated only if persons
are intentionallydeprived of their property.The Court did not elaborateon
the state-of-mind requirement, but the intent standard is susceptible of
being interpretedas establishing the same standardof liability under the
Due Process Clause as the Court has elaboratedfor recovery under ? 1983
against individual state officers who violate federal law. In Harlow v.
Fitzgerald,124the Court held that officials are subject to damage liability
only when they violate "clearly established" federal law. Although the
"clearly established" standard, especially as interpreted in such cases
as Anderson v. Creighton,125seems more stringent than the Due Process
Clause's "intentional" or "nonnegligent" standard, this Term's cases
suggest a convergence. In Alden, the Court described the "clearly
established" standardas determiningwhen a wrong is "fairly attributable"
to the officer.126 This may not signal a weakening of the standard,but it
does indicate that the Court perceives it as reflecting a minimum standard
of fairness. On the other hand, the opinion in Florida Prepaid suggests
a possible transmutation of the "nonnegligent" standard into a
"recklessness" standard, which begins to resemble more closely the
"clearly established" standard,as it has actuallybeen applied.127
This possible convergence offers some support for the claim that the
remedy required by the Due Process Clause is a remedy against state
officials, but the support is very weak. First, it is far from clear that the

123. See Vdzquez,supranote 14, at 1770.
124. 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
125. 483 U.S. 635 (1987).
126. Aldenv. Maine,119 S. Ct. 2240, 2267 (1999).
127. The Courtin FloridaPrepaidcitedthe fact thatCongressdid not "focus on instancesof
intentionalor recklessinfringementon the partof the States"as indicatingthatit was not focusing
on violationsof due process.FloridaPrepaidPostsecondaryEduc. ExpenseBd. v. College Sav.
Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2199, 2209-10 (1999). On the other hand, it suggested elsewhere that
"nonnegligent"infringementmaybe the standard.See id. at 2210.
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Courthas the same standardin mind for the two contexts.128Moreover, the
claim that the Due Process Clause requiresa remedy only if the state or its
officers have violated clearly established state law is in tension with the
Court's holding in Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation129that the
Court's constitutional interpretations must be applied retroactively to
pending tax refund suits if the interpretationwas applied to the parties in
the case in which it was rendered.130
Although this holding may technically
be compatible with a remedial rule under which damages would be
unavailableto taxpayersif the constitutionalinterpretationthat renderedthe
law invalid had not been clearly established at the time the tax was
collected,"3'the latter rule would appearto renderthe retroactivityholding
wholly irrelevant.132
The Court could reconcile Harper with a "clearly
established" standard for other types of property cases by limiting
the retroactivityholding to suits seeking restitutionof taxes paid without a
prior hearing,133
but neither Harper nor Florida Prepaid alludes to such a
limitation. In view of the weakness and ambiguity of the support for the

128. It shouldbe noted,moreover,thatthis convergentstandard,if such it is, wouldbe only a
defaultrule.Thedueprocessstandardrepresentsa mandatoryfederalfloor.Theofficers'qualified
immunityfor violationsof federallaw that were not clearlyestablished,on the otherhand,has
been treated by the Court as a subconstitutionalceiling. Unless the Court means to
constitutionalizethe officers' qualifiedimmunity,cf SeminoleTribev. Florida,517 U.S. 44, 71
n.15 (1996) (suggestingthat this immunitymay have constitutionalunderpinnings),Congress
would have the power to dispensewith it and renderstate officials liable for violationsof notclearly-established
federallaw. If so, then the convergentstandardwould applyunless Congress
establishesa morelenientone.
129. 509 U.S. 86 (1993).
130. See id. at 97. The Courtthusrejectedthe positionof the pluralityin AmericanTrucking
Ass'ns v. Smith,496 U.S. 167, 183 (1990), underwhich constitutionalinterpretations
were held
not to be retroactivelyapplicableif the statehadreasonablyreliedon the priorconstruction.
131. Cf JamesB. Beam DistillingCo. v. Georgia,501 U.S. 529, 544 (1991) (holdingthat a
new constitutionalinterpretationapplies retroactively,but expressly reserving questions of
remedy).
132. Compare Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749 (1995), in which the Court

rejecteda state's attemptto deny on state-law"remedial"groundsa remedyfor a violationof a
constitutionalrulingthatthe Courthad found to be retroactivelyapplicableto the case at hand.
Althoughthe Courtrecognizedthatsome state-lawremediallimitationsmightbe valid,it held that
such limitationsare invalid if they are based on the same considerationsthat underliefederal
retroactivitydoctrine.To hold otherwise,the Courtsaid, would reducethe federalretroactivity
rule to "symbolicsignificance."Id. at 753. Althoughthis decisiondoes not beardirectlyon the
applicabilityof a federalremediallimitationof damagerelief to cases involving a violationof
clearlyestablishedfederallaw, its reasoningis in tensionwith the existenceof such a limitation.
Cf RICHARD H. FALLON ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 853 (4th ed. 1996) (suggestingthat Reynoldsville Casket "cast doubton the
permissibilityof denying relief, as a matterof remedialdiscretion,for violation of a 'novel'
constitutionalrule"). On the otherhand,the relief thatthe statecourthaddeniedin thatcase was
essentiallyprospectiverelief; the Court'sholding is thus consistentwith the view that damage
relief is available against the state for deprivationsof propertyand liberty that violate a
retroactivelyapplicableprincipleof federal law only if the federal-lawprinciplewas clearly
established.
133. See Richard Fallon & Daniel Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional
Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REv. 1731, 1824-33 (1991).
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officer-liability view in Florida Prepaid, the remainderof my analysis will
assume that the Court did not reject the prevailing interpretationof
McKesson, under which the adequate postdeprivationremedy requiredby
the Due Process Clause is a remedy againstthe state itself.
The practical difference between the officer-liability and governmentliability regimes is in any event probablynot great.134As noted, an officerliability regime would presumablybe adequateonly if it were reasonably
clear which officers would be personally liable for infringements.In such
circumstances,however, the relevant officers would tend to steer clear of
depriving persons of property or liberty. Since excessive caution would
likely redound to the detriment of the states, the states would find it
necessary to offer to indemnify officers for any (or at least some) federal
liabilities. States could pass statutesundertakingto reimburseofficers under
given circumstances,or they could agree to reimbursethem in employment
contracts. Alternatively, they could pay the officers' liability-insurance
premiums.Regardlessof which scheme is adopted,the propertyholder will
be assuredof substantialpayment, and the financial burdenwill ultimately
be borne by the state.135In the end, de jure officer liability is likely to mean
de facto state liability. If so, it may simply be easier for all concerned for
the state to establish an adequateremedy againstitself.136
Whether Florida Prepaid resurrects the forum-allocation view for
deprivationsof liberty and propertydepends as well on the resolution of
another ambiguity in the Court's decision. Under the forum-allocation
view, the states are requiredto entertainin their own courts suits against
themselves seeking remedies required by federal law, and, if they fail to
134. See John Jeffries,In Praise of the Eleventh Amendment and Section 1983, 84 VA. L.
REV.47, 60-68 (1998); VAzquez,supranote 14, at 1790-804.This wouldcertainlybe the case if
the samestandardof liabilityandstate-of-mindrequirement
appliedunderthe Due ProcessClause
in suits againstthe stateas in suits againstthe officer. If the officer were entitledto an immunity
for violations of not-clearly-established
law, but the state were liable for all nonnegligent
violations,the regimeswould differ to a greaterextent.Even if the point of giving the officer a
broaderimmunity were to reduce the risk of overdeterrenceattributableto (1) the added
embarrassment
the officermightsufferat beingpersonallynameda defendantand(2) the (slight)
risk thatthe officer mightactuallyhave to pay the victim some money fromhis own pocket,the
officer'simmunitywouldnarrowthe rangeof cases for whicha remedywouldbe available.Fora
comparisonof the officer-liabilityand government-liabilityregimes in the light of official
immunityandindemnification,see Vdzquez,supranote3.
135. For an elaborationof the propositionsin this paragraph,see V~zquez,supranote 14, at
1801-04.If the statedoes not find it necessaryto makeadjustmentsin its compensationpackage
to officers, that will be because the marketfor such jobs has alreadyfully accountedfor the
officers'potentialliabilityfor deprivationsof propertyor liberty.
136. If the remedyrequiredby Due Processwere a remedyagainstthe official, then, strictly
speaking,FloridaPrepaidwould not resurrectthe forum-allocation
view, as thatview relatedto
suits againstthe state itself. Suits againstofficers did not fall withinthe states' immunityunder
eitherthe forum-allocation
view orthe immunity-from-liability
view. Of course,if the Courtwere
to extendsovereignimmunityto suits againststateofficers,thenAldenwould meanthatofficers
would not be liable,but FloridaPrepaid,if readto embracethe officer-liabilityinterpretation
of
McKesson,wouldpartiallyresurrectthe forum-allocation
view.
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provide such remedies, the SupremeCourt may reverse theirjudgments on
appeal. The Courtin Alden held that sovereign immunityprotectsthe states
from suits in their own courts seeking monetary relief. Florida Prepaid
would resurrectfor property and liberty interests the scheme rejected in
Alden only if the Court were envisioning that the states would be required
to provide a remedy in their own courts for intentional deprivations of
propertyor liberty, notwithstandingany claim of sovereign immunity, and
that the Supreme Court could reverse state-courtjudgments that fail to
provide the remedy on sovereign immunity grounds.Is that the regime that
the Courtwas contemplating?
It appearsto be. To insist on sovereign immunityis to deny a remedy;if
the Due Process Clause requires the remedy, it precludes a defense of
sovereign immunity."' Perhaps a state would be permitted to insist on
sovereign immunityif it substitutedan adequateremedy against the officer,
but, as noted, it is likely that states that permit suits against officers would
find themselves footing the bill anyway. At any rate, to insist on sovereign
immunity without affording an adequate alternativeremedy would appear
to be a violation of the obligation under the Due Process Clause to provide
an adequateremedy. If the state denies a remedy on sovereign immunity
grounds,or provides an inadequateremedy, presumablythe SupremeCourt
may review the case and reverse on the ground that the state courts
committedlegal errorin giving effect to the claim of sovereign immunity."38
That the Court contemplated this result is suggested by its treatmentof
Reich in Alden. Reich was among the cases to hold that the Due Process
Clause in certaincircumstancesrequiresa damageremedy against the state.
As discussed above, the Court in Alden distinguished the case as one in
which the remedy was requiredby the Constitution-in that case the Due
Process Clause itself. The language in Reich that the Court distinguished
affirmed that if the Due Process Clause requires a remedy, then the states
must provide it, "the sovereign immunity States traditionallyenjoy in their
own courts notwithstanding."139
An alternativeview would be that the Due Process Clause requiresthe
state to provide the remedy, but that a state's invocation of sovereign
immunitywill be respectedby the SupremeCourton direct review. On this
137. See Reichv. Collins,513 U.S. 106,109-10 (1994).
138. The Courtthis Termunanimouslyreaffirmedthe holdingof McKessonand othercases
thatthe EleventhAmendmentdoes not limitthe SupremeCourt'sappellatejurisdiction.See South
Cent.Bell Tel. Co. v. Alabama,119 S. Ct. 1180, 1184 (1999).
139. Reich, 513 U.S. at 110; see also Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2259 (1999). The
Courtin Alden describedReich as a case in which the Due ProcessClause requireda remedy
againstthe statebecausethe statehad "promised"one. See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2259. This may
provideadditionalsupportfor the officer-liabilityinterpretation
of McKesson:The Due Process
Clause does not always requirea remedyagainstthe state itself, but if the state immunizesits
officers and substitutesa remedy against the state, then the Due Process Clause requiresan
adequateremedyagainstthe state.
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view, the state's denial of the remedy requiredby the Due Process Clause
would simply triggerCongress's power to enforce the clause by making the
states suable in federal court. This regime would certainly be odd, for it
would require the simultaneous acceptance of seemingly contradictory
positions: (1) States are obliged by the Due Process Clause to provide an
adequate remedy, but (2) states may deny any remedy by invoking
sovereign immunity. But this result does find some oblique support in
Supreme Court opinions. In Seminole Tribe, for example, the Court
indicated that the Supreme Court would have appellate jurisdiction over
suits against states in the state courts only if the states had consented to
suit.140 A state that invokes sovereign immunity is not consenting to suit.
And in Coeur d'Alene, Justice Kennedyelaborateda conception of Ex parte
Youngas serving a sort of backstop function, permittingthe federal courts
to step in when the states refuse to provide the forms of relief necessary to
vindicate federal law.141As I have writtenelsewhere, this is in tension with
the idea, supportedby General Oil Co. v. Crain,142 that the state courts are
requiredby the Constitutionto provide such remedies themselves, and that
the SupremeCourtcan reverse theirjudgmentsif they do not.143Finally, the
Court appears to have embraced the seemingly contradictorypositions
described above with respect to the sovereign immunity of the United
States in takings cases. Although the Courthas said that "in the event of a
taking, the compensationremedy is requiredby the Constitution,"1 it has
140. See SeminoleTribev. Florida,517 U.S. 44, 71 n.14 (1996).
141. See Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 271 (1997) (pluralityopinion)
("Wherethereis no availablestateforumthe Youngrulehas specialsignificance.In thatinstance
providinga federalforumfor a justiciablecontroversyis a specific applicationof the principle
thatthe planof the conventioncontemplatesa regimein whichfederalguaranteesareenforceable
so long as there is a justiciablecontroversy.");Vdzquez,supra note 11, at 49-50 (examining
JusticeKennedy'sapparentconceptionof Ex parte Youngas a backstop,permittingthe federal
courtsto enforcefederalrightsthatstatecourtsdeclineto enforce).
142. 209 U.S. 211 (1908).
143. See Vdzquez,supra note 11, at 50 n.319 (discussingJustice Kennedy'streatmentof
Crainin Coeurd'Alene).This alternativeregimewould also help explainan otherwisepuzzling
featureof the Parrattline of cases. As noted,the Courthas held in those cases thatpersonswho
aredeprivedof theirlibertyor propertyin a randomandunauthorizedway may obtaina damages
remedy in federal court under ? 1983 if positive state law does not offer an adequate
postdeprivationremedy. If the Due Process Clause requiresthe states to provide a remedy,
however,and if that requirementwere enforceableby the SupremeCourteven in the face of a
claim of sovereignimmunity,thenit is unclearwhy the absenceof a positivestate-lawsourcefor
the state-courtremedyshouldmatter.See Vdzquez,supranote 14, at 1757 n.331. By contrast,the
availabilityof a damagesremedy in federal court under ? 1983 would be explicable undera
regime in which sovereignimmunitybars SupremeCourtreview of suits againstunconsenting
states,even if the remedyis requiredby the Due ProcessClause.Undersuch a regime,the state's
failureto providea remedyrequiredby the Due ProcessClausemerelytriggersa federalpowerto
providethe remedy.
144. First English EvangelicalLutheranChurchv. Countyof Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304
(1987); see also Paul J. Heald & Michael L. Wells, Remedies for the Misappropriation of
Intellectual Property by State and Municipal Governments Before and After Seminole Tribe: The
Eleventh Amendment and Other Immunity Doctrines, 55 WASH. & LEE L. Rev. 849, 871-73

(1998) (describingstates'remedialobligationsundertheTakingsClause).
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also taken the position that a suit for compensationmay not be maintained
against the United States in the absence of a waiver of sovereign
immunity."45

On the other hand, Alden's treatment of Reich suggests that the
Seminole Tribe dictum about consent is subject to an exception where the
Constitution itself requires the remedy. Justice Kennedy's "backstop"
interpretationof Ex parte Young garnered only the vote of the Chief
Justice.146
More importantly,Kennedy's majorityopinion in Alden appears
to reject the conception of Ex parte Young that he espoused in Coeur
d'Alene. The Alden Courtdescribed Crain as a case in which the rule of Ex
parte Young was "extend[ed]" to "state-court suits."'147If the majority
viewed Ex parte Young as providing a federal-courtbackstop for cases in
which the state courts failed to provide a remedy, it is unclearhow that rule
could have been "extended" to state-courtsuits. The majoritynow appears
to accept Crain as establishing a right to an injunctiveremedy against state
officials in state courts, enforceable by the Supreme Court on appeal,
paralleling the right to a remedy in federal court recognized in Ex parte
Young.
Perhaps the Young-Crainprinciple is irrelevant anyway because the
remedy it recognized was one against the official ratherthan the state itself,
and state sovereign immunity does not extend to officers. But Crain and
Youngboth involved prospective relief, and in that context the distinction
between suits against the state and suits against the officer is almost purely
formal.Alden, moreover,says thatEx parte Youngis based on "the premise
that sovereign immunitybars relief against States and their officers in both
state and federal courts."148 It then asserts that Crain and Youngestablish
that "certain suits for declaratoryor injunctive relief" may be brought in
state and federal courts, notwithstandingthis immunity,"if the Constitution
is to remain the supreme law of the land."149 The Court thus seems to be
saying that while state sovereign immunity does extend to officials, it is
overriddenin certain cases based on federal law by the remedial demands
of the SupremacyClause.150Similarly, one could say that the states are not
145. See Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579, 580-82 (1934); Schillingerv. United
States, 155 U.S. 163, 168 (1894); see also Websterv. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 613 (1988) (Scalia,J.,
dissenting)("No one would suggestthat,if Congresshad not passed the TuckerAct, 28 U.S.C.
? 1491(a)(1), the courts would be able to order disbursementsfrom the Treasuryto pay for
propertytakenunderlawfulauthority(andsubsequentlydestroyed)withoutjust compensation.").

See generally Robert Brauneis, The First Constitutional Tort: The Remedial Revolution in
Nineteenth-Century State Just Compensation Law, 52 VAND. L. REv. 57, 137-39 (1999)

(discussingsovereignimmunityconstraintson recoveryfor governmenttakings).
146. See Coeur d'Alene, 521 U.S. at 261, 263-64, 270-71.
147. Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2263 (1999).

148. Id. (emphasisadded).
149. Id.
150. See U.S. CONST.art.VI, cl. 2.
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entitled to insist on the sovereign immunitythatthey would otherwiseenjoy
from privatedamage actions if the Due Process Clause requiresthe remedy.
If the state court fails to provide the requiredremedy, the U.S. Supreme
Courtmay reverse its judgment.
The Court's treatmentof the sovereign immunityof the United States in
takings cases offers some supportfor the opposite view. If a constitutionally
requireddamage remedy against the federal governmentmay not be sought
in court without the federal government's consent, then perhaps the
constitutional scheme does not require the availability of private suits to
recover similarconstitutionallyrequiredremedies againstthe states without
their consent.151 There may be ways to reconcile the federal sovereign
immunitycases with the position that states may not rely on their sovereign
immunity to deny a remedy requiredby the Constitution,152 but this issue
need not detain us further.If indeed the United States is immune from suits
seeking compensation for unlawful takings of propertyunless it consents,
then the immunity of the states is indisputably different in at least one
importantrespect: As the Court held in Florida Prepaid, the states may be
subjected to such suits without their consent if the federal government
authorizesthem pursuantto Section 5 of the FourteenthAmendment.
By exercising its abrogationpower, Congress can effectively require
the states to provide the constitutionally required remedy in their own
courts on pain of federal reversalof theirjudgments. Contraryto the claims
of some commentators,153 Florida Prepaid does not necessarily hold that

abrogation of sovereign immunity is permissible only if the states have
engaged in a pattern of prior violations of the Constitution. The opinion
suggests strongly that a statute abrogatingstate sovereign immunity would
be valid, even in the absence of a finding of prior violations of the
Constitution, if it included the sovereign immunity equivalent of a
"jurisdictionalhook." In striking down the abrogationin the patent laws,
the Courtnoted that " Congress did nothing to limit the coverage of the Act
to cases involving arguableconstitutionalviolations, such as where a State
151. Cf Pennsylvaniav. UnionGas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 34 (1989) (Scalia,J., concurringin part
anddissentingin part)("I thinkit impossibleto find in the schemeof the Constitutiona necessity
thatprivateremedies[againstthe states]be expanded... to includea remedynot available,for a
similarinfraction,againstthe UnitedStates.").
152. For example,the Courtcould resolve the apparentcontradictionbetweenFirst English
andthe sovereignimmunitycases by limitingthe former'sstatementthatthe Constitutionrequires
the compensationremedyto takingsby entitiesnot entitledto sovereignimmunity.See Brauneis,
supra note 145, at 138 & n.344. In other cases, the constitutionallyrequiredremedy for an
uncompensatedtakingby the state and federalgovernmentsmight be the nullity of the taking,
combinedwith a damageremedyagainstresponsibleofficers.See id. This wouldbe tantamount
to
an embraceof the officer-liabilityregimediscussedaboveandin Vdzquez,supranote 14.
153. See Laurence H. Tribe, Saenz Sans Prophecy: Does the Privileges or Immunities Revival
Portend the Future-or Reveal the Structure of the Present?, 111 HARV. L. REv. 110, 138 (1999)

(interpretingFlorida Prepaid as permittingabrogationonly if it is "narrowlytailored to
preventionor remedyof a demonstrablepatternof constitutionalviolations").
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refuses to offer any state-courtremedy for patent owners whose patents it
had infringed."154 This suggests that Congress could authorize a federalcourt suit against any state that violates the Constitutionand fails to afford
the constitutionallyrequiredremedy.155If Congress can subject a state to an
original suit in the lower federal courts in such circumstances,then it can
surely take the lesser step of authorizingappeals to the Supreme Court, or
presumablyto lower federal courts,156from state-courtactions seeking the
constitutionally required remedy.'57Indeed, the Florida Prepaid opinion
suggests that Congress may authorize suits against the states directly in
federal court if the states do not have a statute on the books authorizing
such suits in state courts.158If Congress passes a statutemaking it clear that
states shall be suable directly in federal court unless they have such a
statute on the books, then states are very likely to enact such statutes. If
Congress provides further that the judgments of such courts shall be
reviewable by the SupremeCourt or by inferior federal courts, then it will
have substantiallyreplicatedthe forum-allocationregime.
Even if the Due Process Clause requires states to provide a remedy
against themselves in their own courts when they willfully deprive
154. FloridaPrepaidPostsecondaryEduc. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct.
2199, 2210 (1999).
155. In strikingdown the Gun Free School Zones Act in UnitedStates v. Lopez,the Court
said similarlythatthe Act "has no expressjurisdictionalelementwhich mightlimit its reachto a
discreteset of firearmpossessionsthatadditionallyhave an explicitconnectionwith or effect on
interstatecommerce."UnitedStatesv. Lopez,514 U.S. 549, 562 (1995). Congresssoon amended
the statuteto addthe missingjurisdictionalelement.See 18 U.S.C.A. ? 922(q)(2)(a)(West Supp.
1998) ("It shallbe unlawfulfor any individualknowinglyto possess a firearmthathas moved in
or that otherwiseaffects interstateor foreigncommerceat a place thatthe individualknows, or
has reasonablecauseto believe, is a school zone."). The amendedstatutehas been upheldwithout
much controversy.See, e.g., United States v. Shelton, 66 F.3d 991, 992 (8th Cir. 1995) (per
curiam).
156. See James E. Pfander, An Intermediate Solution to State Sovereign Immunity: Federal
Appellate Court Review of State-Court Judgments After Seminole Tribe, 46 UCLA L. REv. 161,

213-28 (1998).
157. A statuteauthorizingsuch appealswouldbe valid,regardlessof whetherone considered
SupremeCourtreviewof a state-courtdismissalon sovereignimmunitygroundsto be an exercise
of originalor appellatejurisdiction.AlthoughMarburyv. Madison,5 U.S. (1 Cranch)137, 174
(1803), held that the SupremeCourtlacks originaljurisdictionover suits arisingunderfederal
law, a suit againsta stateproperlyauthorizedby Congresspursuantto Section5 would appearto
be withinthe SupremeCourt'soriginaljurisdictionas a suit "in which a Stateshall be a Party"
withinthe meaningof ArticleIII, Section2.
158. See supratext accompanyingnote 154. On the otherhand,the Courtelsewheresaid that
it was "worthmentioning"thatFloridastatutesauthorize"a legislativeremedythrougha claims
bill for paymentin full" as well as a judicialremedy.See FloridaPrepaid,119 S. Ct. at 2209 n.9.
If the Courthere meant to suggest that a damagesremedyreceived throughthe grace of the
legislaturewould satisfy the remedialrequirementsof the Due Process Clause,then the statute
abrogatingsovereignimmunitymight have to affordthe states a reasonableamountof time to
consider whetherto grant a legislative remedy. Still, Congress would presumablybe able to
providea federalforumagainststates thatdo not in fact providean adequateremedy-whether
legislativelyor judicially-within a reasonabletime. Clearly,the mereexistenceof a mechanism
underwhich a propertyholder may requesta legislative remedydoes not satisfy the remedial
demandsof the Due ProcessClauseif the legislaturefails to providea remedy.
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individuals of liberty or property, and even if their failure to do so is
reviewable by the SupremeCourt, the due process regime may differ from
the forum-allocation regime in some details. The Supreme Court would
have the power to reverse any state courtjudgment that denied a remedy on
sovereign immunity grounds, or that applied a remedial standardthat was
inadequateas a matterof law. But otherwise, appellatereview in the federal
courts may be limited. It is possible that errorsof fact would be reviewable
only under the " some evidence" standard.159 As a practical matter,
however, this would not represent a dramatic departurefrom the forumallocation model, as the SupremeCourtrarelyreviews a case just to correct
a factualerror.
Of greater concern is the possibility that errors of law would not be
reviewable de novo. Perhapsthe Court would say that it is empowered to
reverse only if the state proceeding violated due process, and that a state
proceeding in which a disinterestedjudge received evidence following fair
proceduresand conscientiously found the facts and appliedthe law satisfies
due process even if the judge committedlegal error.If so, then the "clearly
established" standardthe Court uses in the officer-liability context may
find its way into the due process regime throughthe back door.160Whether
an error of law constitutes a violation of due process is a question that
rarely arises,16 but the recent decisions cutting back on the availability of
habeas relief may suggest a negative answer.162Subjecting Supreme Court
review to some variantof the Harlow standardwould constitute a marked
difference between the due process regime and the forum-allocationregime.
But the Court, I think, is more likely to hold that de novo review of
questions of federal law is available in the Supreme Court.163If so, then,
159. See Superintendent
v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 447 (1985); Thompsonv. City of Louisville,
362 U.S. 199, 206 (1960); see also Gerald Neuman, The Constitutional Requirement of "Some

Evidence," 25 SANDIEGO
L. REv.631 (1988).
160. Presumably,the judge's applicationof the law would not count as conscientiousif it
conflictedwithclearfederalprecedent.
161. To be sure," [t]heCourtin Crowell[v.Benson,285 U.S. 22 (1932),] appearedto assume
that Article III, the Due Process Clause, or both requiredindependentjudicial decision of
questionsof law in privaterights cases." FALLON
ET AL., supra note 132, at 397. But I am
assumingthatthe statecourtshave providedan "independentjudicialdecision."The questionis
whetherthe Due ProcessClauserequiresde novo reviewof such a decision.The Courtin Crowell
was discussingwhetherjudicial review of the decisions of federaladministrativeagencies was
required,andit readthe relevantstatutesto guaranteede novo reviewof questionsof law.
162. For example,thoughthe federalhabeasstatutefor state prisonersauthorizedrelief for
those "in custody in violationof the Constitutionor laws or treatiesof the United States," 28
U.S.C. ? 2254 (1994), the Court held in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), that a state
convictioncould not be challengedon habeason the basis of legal errorsregardingthe exclusion
of evidenceunderthe FourthAmendmentso long as the statecourthad offered a "full and fair
hearing" on the question. This may suggest that depriving someone of his liberty who has
received such a hearing does not violate the Due Process Clause even if legal error was
committed.
163. The Courthas so far seen fit to applyheightenedstandardsonly to the lower federal
courts. It seems uninterestedin limiting the scope of its own powers. See, e.g., Wilson v.
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subject to the reservationsand qualifications stated earlier in this Part, the
due process regime for enforcement of federally created property rights
againstthe states would appearto be a substantialresurrectionof the forumallocation regime for the enforcementof federal statutoryrights against the
states.
III. COLLEGESAVINGSBANK ANDTHENARROWING
OFDUE PROCESS
Though the regime the Court appearsto have in mind for propertyand
liberty rights may differ in some details from the forum-allocationregime,
it sufficiently resembles it that the Court's decision in Florida Prepaid may
fairly be regardedas a partialresurrectionof that regime. The resurrection
is partial, most importantlybecause it applies only to state violations of
federal obligations that give rise to propertyor liberty interests within the
meaning of the Due Process Clause. In this Part, I consider the meaning of
the concept of "property" after the Court's decision this Term in College
Savings Bank. I consider specifically whether the right claimed by the
plaintiffs in Alden constitutes a propertyright under the Court's prevailing
doctrine.If it does, then the Courtin Florida Prepaid either resurrectedthe
forum-allocationview with respect to the very sort of right involved in the
case in which the Courtpurportedto reject the same view, or repudiatedthe
understandingof "property"thathad prevaileduntil then.
A. Background
The Court's attemptsto give a precise definition to the terms "liberty"
and "property" for purposes of procedural due process are of
comparativelyrecent vintage.l16 Writing in 1980, John Hart Ely observed
that
[u]ntil recently, the general outlines of the law of proceduraldue
process were pretty clear and uncontroversial.The phrase "life,
liberty or property" was read as a unit and given an open-ended,
functionalinterpretation,which meant that the governmentcouldn't
seriously hurt you without due process of law. What process was
"due" varied, naturally enough, with context, in particularwith
how seriously you were being hurt and what procedureswould be
Arkansas,514 U.S. 927 (1995) (demonstratingthat the relief unavailablein the lower federal
courtsunderTeaguev. Lane,489 U.S. 288 (1989); and Powell, 428 U.S. 465, is availablein the
SupremeCourton directappeal);Griffithv. Kentucky,479 U.S. 314 (1987);see also SouthCent.
Bell Tel. Co. v. Alabama,119 S. Ct. 1180, 1184 (1999) (holdingthatthe EleventhAmendment
does not limitthe SupremeCourt'sappellatejurisdiction).
164. Attemptsto define "liberty"for purposesof substantivedue process,on the otherhand,
have been longstandingandcontroversial.See, e.g., Lochnerv. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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useful and feasible under the circumstances. But if you were
seriously hurtby the state you were entitled to due process.165
According to Henry Monaghan, the Court in this period read the Due
Process Clause to protect "all interests valued by sensible men."166 The
right-privilegedistinctionlimited the scope of substantivedue process, and
may for a time have limited procedural due process as well,'67 but the
distinction was largely abandoned before the Court decided Goldberg v.
Kelly,168 the case most closely identified with the concept of "new
property." Goldberg itself was not a significant departure from the
approachdescribedby Ely and Monaghan.169Indeed, all sides conceded that
the government's withdrawalof welfare benefits had to comply with due
process.'70The Court's confirmationthat such benefits were propertycame
in a footnote and stressed the importance of such benefits to their
recipients.'7'Goldberg has been described as a "lodestar,"172 and has been
blamed (or credited)for the " due process explosion" that followed it.'73Its
controversial feature, however, was not its conclusion that welfare was
property,but ratherits decision about the sort of process that was due in
welfare cases. As Judge Henry Friendly observed, "After the usual litany
that the required hearing 'need not take the form of a judicial or quasijudicial trial,' Mr. Justice Brennan proceeded to demand almost all the
elements of one." 174
The Burger Court subsequentlyadopted a more flexible balancing test
for determiningwhat process is due,'75but at the same time, it obviated that
165. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 19 (1980); see also TimothyP. Terrell,
"Property," "Due Process," and the Distinction Between Definition and Theory in Legal
Analysis,70 GEO.L.J. 861, 881 (1982) (" [I]nsteadof focusing on the basis for a due process
inquiry-the deprivationof some element of the trigger mechanism [i.e., 'life, liberty, or
property']-the SupremeCourtlargelyignoredthat issue and preoccupieditself almostentirely
with the narrowproceduralfairnessof the administrative
processinvolved.").
166. HenryPaul Monaghan,Of "Liberty" and "Property," 62 CORNELL L. REv. 405, 409
(1977);see also id. at 423 (citingButlerv. Perry,240 U.S. 328 (1916), for the propositionthatthe
conceptof "liberty"embraces"all the interestsin personalsecurity... whichhadbeen protected
from privateinterferenceby the common-lawcourts").But cf. StephenF. Williams,Libertyand
Property: The Problem of Government Benefits, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 3, 20 n.68 (1983) (disputing
Monaghan).
167. See William W. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in

Constitutional
Law,81 HARV.L. REV.1439 (1968);Williams,supranote 166, at 20-21 & n.68.
168. 397 U.S. 254, 262 n.8 (1970). See generallyVan Alstyne,supranote 167.
169. But cf. Williams,supranote 166, at 14-15, 20-21 n.68 (arguingthatGoldberg'sreliance
on the importanceof the interestwas an innovation).
170. See id. at 14.
171. See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 262 n.8 (citing Charles Reich, Individual Rights and Social
Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245 (1965); Charles Reich, The New
Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964)).

172. HenryJ. Friendly,"SomeKindof Hearing,"123 U. PA.L. REv. 1267, 1299 (1975).
173. Id. at 1268.
174. Id. at 1299.

175. See Mathewsv. Eldridge,424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976).
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issue in many cases by adopting narrowerdefinitions of the concepts that
trigger the obligation to afford due process-liberty and property.Having
previously found that the deprivationof a governmentjob triggers the Due
Process Clause,'76the Court in Board of Regents v. Roth held that a
governmentjob is a propertyright only if the employee has a legitimate
expectation of continued employment.177 The employee's expectation of
employment is legitimate if the state's power to terminatethe employment
is limited by statuteor contract.178But someone who holds a job terminable
after a year lacks a property interest in the job after the expiration of
the year, as he has no "legitimate" expectation to continue to hold the
job.'79The "entitlement,"or "legitimateexpectation," standardhas largely
displaced the test focusing on the importanceof the right.'80Under this test,
a person possesses a property right whenever the law places mandatory
obligations on the state for his benefit.'8'
The Court's emphasis on the legitimate expectation resting on statutes
or other positive law was taken a step furtherby then-JusticeRehnquist's
plurality opinion in Arnett v. Kennedy'82and by the Court in Bishop v.
Wood.'83The latter suggested what the former had expressly adopted, the
"bitter with the sweet" theory, under which a putative property right
createdby statuteincludes as partof its definition the proceduresthe statute
establishes for its termination.'84Under this theory, if state law provides
that employees may be terminatedonly for good cause, but the statutegoes
on to state that the job may be terminatedwithout notice or a hearing, the
latter limitations are regardedas a part of the definition of the employee's
propertyright. In Justice Rehnquist's words, the employee "must take the
bitter with the sweet." 185 According to this view, for any property right
created by statute, the procedures set forth in the statute would always
satisfy due process. Professor Van Alstyne regarded this approach as a
major "crack in the new property,"186 even though only a minority of the
Court had subscribed to it in Arnett. The Court repaired this crack in
176. See Connellv. Higginbotham,403 U.S. 207, 208 (1971); Slochowerv. Boardof Higher
Educ.,350 U.S. 551, 559 (1956);Wiemanv. Updegraff,344 U.S. 183, 191 (1952).
177. 408 U.S. 564, 578 (1972).
178. See, e.g., ClevelandBd. of Educ.v. Loudermill,470 U.S. 532, 538-39 (1985); Arnettv.
Kennedy,416 U.S. 134, 155 (1974) (Rehnquist,J., pluralityopinion).
179. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 578.

180. See Williams,supranote 166, at 4-5.
181. See TimothyP. Terrell,Causesof Actionas Property:Loganv. ZimmermanBrushCo.
and the "Government-as-Monopolist" Theory of the Due Process Clause, 31 EMORYL.J. 491,

499 (1982).
182. 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
183. 426 U.S. 341 (1976).
184. See id. at 153-54(pluralityopinion).

185. Id. at 153.
186. See William Van Alstyne, Cracks in "The New Property": Adjudicative Due Process in
the Administrative State, 62 CORNELL
L. REv. 445 (1977).
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ClevelandBoard of Education v. Loudermill,in which a majorityexpressly
disavowed the "bitter with the sweet" theory,187over Justice Rehnquist's
dissent.188The Courtheld that the Due Process Clause requireda distinction
between substantiveand procedurallimitations;only substantivelimitations
included in the statute creating the right are relevant to whethera property
right exists; if one does exist, procedurallimitations must satisfy the Due
Process Clause.189
Until Seminole Tribe, there appearedto be little reason to deny that the
FourteenthAmendmentright to due process of law applied to all persons
seeking to enforce mandatorylegal obligations of the states. In Seminole
Tribe, however, the Court held that Congress has the power to abrogate
Eleventh Amendment immunity pursuantto the FourteenthAmendment,
but not pursuantto Article I. Under the prevailing definition of property,
Congress would potentially have an easy way to circumvent the latter
holding: If any mandatory legal obligation imposed by Congress under
Article I for the benefit of privateindividuals were deemed to give rise to a
correlative property (or liberty) right under the Due Process Clause,
Congress would arguably be able to abrogate sovereign immunity under
Section 5 to "enforce" any such obligations. Acceptance of such a power
would have effectively gutted Seminole Tribe's holding.'90 The Court
avoided this problem in Florida Prepaid by holding that, even if there is a
property right, Congress may abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity
from federal-courtjurisdictiononly if the states fail to afford a remedy for
the deprivationin their own courts.'9'But the Court's affirmationthat the
Due Process Clause requires the states to provide a remedy in their own
courts, when combined with the "legitimate expectation" test for defining
property, threatens to gut the Court's holding in Alden that states are
entitled to sovereign immunity in their own courts. This problem would,
indeed, have existed even under the narrower test espoused by Justice
Rehnquist in Arnett, but later disavowed in Loudermill. The Court in
College Savings Bank avoided a total gutting of Alden by embracing an
even narrowerdefinition of property.The cost of this partialpreservationof

187. 470 U.S. 532, 540 (1985) (quotingArnettv. Kennedy,416 U.S. 134 (1974)).
188. See id. at 561 (Rehnquist,J., dissenting).
189. See id. at 541.
190. I havecalledthis problemthe "abrogationreductio."Vdzquez,supranote 14, at 1744.
191. As discussedabove, Chief JusticeRehnquist'sopinion also makes it clear that, in the
case of a statutorilycreatedpropertyright,the Due ProcessClausedoes not necessarilyrequireall
the proceduresthatthe statutegives the propertyholder.See supratext accompanyingnotes 182184. Thus,eitherhe has abandonedthe "bitterwith the sweet" theoryor the theoryincorporates
proceduresinto the definitionof the propertyrightonly when the statuteestablishesprocedures
thatwouldotherwisefall shortof due process.
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Alden, however, was a correspondingconstriction of the basic protections
of the Due Process Clause.192
The Court's previous efforts to respond to the "due process explosion"
by limiting the definition of "liberty" and "property"have not been well
received. Accordingto ProfessorEly,
What has ensued has been a disaster, in both practical and
theoreticalterms. Not only has the numberof occasions on which
one is entitled to any procedural protection at all been steadily
constricted, but the Court has made itself look quite silly in the
process-drawing distinctions it is flatteringto call attenuated,and
engaging in ill-disguised prematurejudgments on the merits of the
case before it .... The line of decisions has been subjected to
widespreadscholarly condemnation,which suggests that sometime
within the next thirtyyears we may be rid of it.'93
Since those words were writtenin 1980, the doctrinein this areahas taken a
significant step in what ProfessorEly would presumablyconsider the right
direction with the rejection of the "bitter with the sweet" theory. College
Savings Bank, however, suggests that the doctrine will get worse before it
gets better. As discussed below, the decision appearsto rest on distinctions
even sillier than those Ely criticized. Moreover, even the decisions that
Ely criticized recognized that "liberty" and "property" are " greatt
concepts ... purposely left to gather meaning from experience.... [Whey
relate to the whole domain of social and economic fact, and the statesmen
who foundedthis Nation knew too well that only a stagnantsociety remains
unchanged."194 This functionalist approach to defining "property"'
192. There would have been no need to mold a definition of propertyto accommodate
sovereignimmunitydoctrineif the Courthad decidedeither(1) that the statesmay not rely on
sovereignimmunityin their own courtsto refuse to providea remedyto which Congresshas
subjectedthem in conformitywith the TenthAmendment,or (2) that, if a remedyis barredby
sovereign immunity,then it is not requiredby the Due Process Clause, even if the state has
deprivedsomeoneof a propertyor libertyinterest.But the Courtrejectedthe firstoptionin Alden,
see supraPartI, andit rejectedthe secondin FloridaPrepaid,see supraPartII.
193. ELY, supranote 165, at 19; see also Monaghan,supranote 166 (criticizingthe Court's
narrowingof libertyand propertyprotectedby the Due Processclause);Terrell,supra note 165
(criticizingthe Court'smethodof determiningpropertyfor due processpurposes);Van Alstyne,
supranote 186 (criticizingrestrictionson new property);Williams,supranote 166 (criticizingthe
Court'sentirenew propertyjurisprudence).
194. Boardof Regentsv. Roth,408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972) (quotingNationalMut.Ins. Co. v.
TidewaterCo., 337 U.S. 582, 646 (1949) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting)).
195. ProfessorMerrillcalls this approachto definingpropertynominalismm."
This school of
thought"views propertyas a purely conventionalconcept with no fixed meaning-an empty
vessel thatcan be filled by each legal systemin accordancewith its peculiarvalues andbeliefs."
ThomasMerrill,Propertyand the RightTo Exclude,77 NEB. L. REV.730, 737 (1998). Although
ProfessorMerrillis not an adherentof this school, he acknowledgesthat" todaya,the nominalist
conceptionis more-or-lessthe orthodoxunderstandingof propertywithin the Americanlegal
community.Law studentshave been instructedfor years that the bundle of rights metaphor
accuratelycapturesthe natureof the institutionof property."Id. at 738.
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contrasts with the Court's more limited approach in the takings area, in
which it has restricted the concept of property to its more traditional
common-law meaning, which takes into account such factors as the
alienabilityof the putativepropertyright.'96
As discussed below, College Savings Bank appears to reject a
functionalistapproachin favor of a search for the essence of the concept of
property.Just how far the Court has retreatedremains uncertain,however.
Because the cursorytreatmentof the issue in College Savings Bank appears
to be internallyinconsistent, the precise holding that the plaintiff lacked a
propertyright could well be interpretednarrowlyin the futureor dismissed
as a sport. Alternatively,the decision might in retrospectbe regardedas an
early step in a drastic contraction of the guarantee of procedural due
process.
B. College Savings Bank
The right at issue in College Savings Bank was the right to be free from
pecuniary injuryresulting from a competitor's false advertisingof its own
product.Congress prohibitedsuch false advertisingin the LanhamAct and
gave injured competitors a right to damages from the false advertiser.'97
Congress made it clear that the prohibition applied to the states, and it
expressly abrogatedthe states' immunity from suit in federal court.'98At
issue in the case was the validity of this abrogation.As in Florida Prepaid,
the plaintiff arguedthat Congress's abrogationof the states' immunity was
"appropriatelegislation" under Section 5 because it sought to "enforce"
the states' obligations under the Due Process Clause. The Court could
easily have struck down the abrogationon the same ground as in Florida
Prepaid, as there appearsto have been no greaterevidence of unremedied
false advertising by states than there was of unremedied state patent
infringements.By deciding instead thatthe interestsinvoked by the plaintiff
were not propertyinterests,'99the Court established that, unlike states that
infringe patents, states that engage in false advertising do not have to
provide retrospectiverelief to those they injure.
Under the "legitimate expectation" test, the right to be free from
injuries caused by the state's false advertising of its own product should
have qualified as a propertyright. Certainly,the plaintiff had an expectation
that it would not suffer such an injury.Congress had specifically prohibited

196. See Vdzquez, supra note 14, at 1752 & n.310.
197. See 15 U.S.C. ? 1125 (1994).
198. See 15 U.S.C.A.?? 1122(a),1125(a)(2)(WestSupp.1999).
199. See College Sav. Bankv. FloridaPrepaidPostsecondaryEduc.ExpenseBd., 119 S. Ct.
2219, 2224-25 (1999).

2000]

Sovereign Immunityand Due Process

1963

false advertising,and the validity of this obligation was not in question.200
The expectationwould appearto have been "legitimate" in the sense that it
was backed by a law placing mandatoryobligations on the state.
The Court nevertheless found that the right was not propertyfor due
process purposes. It stressed that "the hallmark of a protected property
interestis the right to exclude others,"201 and it concluded that the right to
be free from false advertisinglacks this element. For the "right to exclude"
requirement,though, the Court cited a takings case.202The requirement
appearsto be new to due process jurisprudence,where the Court has said
instead that "[t]he hallmark of property... is an individual entitlement
grounded in . .. law, which cannot be removed except 'for cause."'203As
discussed below, the "right to exclude" requirementseems difficult to
square with such "new property" rights as the right to receive welfare
benefits due in the futureor the right to continue to hold a governmentjob.
This may suggest a retreat from that line of cases. But the "right to
exclude" requirementis also difficult to square with some "old" property
rights, including rights that seem indistinguishablefrom the right invoked
by the plaintiff in this very case.
The primary meaning of "exclude" is to bar someone or something
from a place.2' This sense of the "right to exclude" is easy to apply to
rights in real property, but not to other sorts of rights that are clearly
"property."For example, the Courtin College Savings Bank acknowledged
that the Lanham Act's trademarkprovisions "may well" protect property
interests.205In what way do the trademarklaws establish a "right to
exclude"?A secondarymeaningof "exclude" is "to prohibitsomeone from
200. The obligationimposedon the stateswould appearto be valid underthe standardthe
Courtarticulatedin New YorkandPrintz-that is, it is an obligationimposedon statesas partof a
broaderclass thatincludesprivateparties.See supranote49.
201. College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2224.

202. See KaiserAetnav. UnitedStates,444 U.S. 164 (1979).
203. Logan v. ZimmermanBrush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 430 (1982) (citations omitted).
ProfessorMerrillarguesthatthe rightto exclude is "the sine qua non" of property,see Merrill,
supra note 195, but all of the cases he cites in supportof his argumentare takingscases. He
concedesthatit is "a bit of a stretch"to claim that the due processcases are consistentwith his
view. Id. at 752; see also Leonard Kreynin, Breach of Contract as a Due Process Violation: Can
the Constitution Be a Font of Contract Law?, 90 COLUM.L. REv. 1098, 1106 (1990) (noting the

differentdefinitionsof propertyfor the purposesof the Due Process and Takings Clauses);
Vdzquez,supra note 14, at 1752 n.310 (same);cf. EasternEnters.v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 527
(1998) (Breyer,J., dissenting)("Nor does applicationof the Due ProcessClause automatically
triggerthe TakingsClause,just becausethe word'property'appearsin both.Thatwordappearsin
the midstof differentphraseswith somewhatdifferentobjectives,therebypermittingdifferences
in the way in whichthe termis interpreted.").
204. See NEw SHORTER
OXFORDDICTIONARY
875 definition 1 (5th ed. 1993).
205. CollegeSav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2224. The Courtalso concededthatunfaircompetition
amountingto "theftof proprietary
information"is the deprivationof a propertyright.Id. at 2225.
This restson the tautologythat"proprietary
information"is property.But it is worthnotingthat
what makes such informationproprietary-andthus property-is the fact that the law gives the
"owner"of it the rightto prohibitothersfromengagingin certaintypesof conduct.
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an activity."206 It is apparentlythis meaning that the Courthad in mind. In
acknowledgingthat some provisions of the LanhamAct may well establish
propertyrights, the Court said that "trademarks... are the 'property'of the
owner because he can exclude others from using them."207But the term
It is unclear why
"exclude," in this sense, is a synonym for "prohibit."'208
the false-advertisingprovisions of the LanhamAct do not satisfy this test.
Under the Act, the plaintiff clearly had a right to "prohibit"activity on the
part of the defendant. The Act itself prohibits false advertising, but the
plaintiff had the right to prohibit the defendant's false advertising if such
advertisingcaused the plaintiff injury.209
Clearly, this injurysufficed to give
the plaintiff standing to obtain injunctive relief to stop any such false
advertising,and the Eleventh Amendmentdoes not preclude such relief in a
suit against state officials.210Thus, the false-advertisingprovisions of the
LanhamAct cannot be distinguishedfrom the trademarkprovisions on the
ground that the latter include a "right to prohibit" whereas the former do
not.211

Nor can the rights reflected in the Lanham Act's false-advertising
provisions be distinguishedon this ground from other intellectualproperty
rights that the Court has found to be "property." The Court in Florida
Prepaid recognized that a state deprives a patentholderof propertywhen it
intentionallyinfringes the patent.But a state that infringes does not deprive
206. NEWSHORTER
OXFORDDICTIONARY,
supranote 204, at 875 definition 2.
207. College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2224.
208. Similarly, Professor Merrill, who defends the centrality of the right to exclude to the
concept of property, argues that someone who owns a copyright in a song has a right to exclude
because he "can exclude others from performing or copying [the song]." Merrill, supra note 195,
at 741 n.38. Again, a more apt word would have been "prohibit."
209. Surely the Court does not mean that the plaintiff lacks a right to prohibit false
advertising, because the statute itself prohibits such conduct. It is true that the heading of the
pertinent section reads, "False designations of origin and false descriptions forbidden," 15 U.S.C.
? 1125 (1994), but it is noteworthy that the text of the section does nothing more than create a
private right of action for injunctive relief and damages in favor of persons injured by such
advertising.
210. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). On one view, a property rule differs from a
liability rule in that the former is enforceable through an action for an injunction, whereas the
latter is enforceable only in an action for damages. See Guido Calabresi & Douglas Melamed,

PropertyRules,LiabilityRules,and Inalienability:One Viewof the Cathedral,85 HARV.L. REv.
1089, 1105-15 (1972). Under this test, in the light of Ex parte Young and ? 1983, an individual
would possess a property right against a state unless the statute imposing the obligation
affirmatively denies an action for injunctive relief against an officer.
211. It is perhaps awkward to say of the false-advertising plaintiff what the Court in College
Savings Bank said of the trademarkowner: that "he can [prohibit] others from using" the putative
property. College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2224 (emphasis added). If so, it is because of a
deficiency in our language, not a deficiency in the former's rights as compared to the latter.
Although we say that A has a right to prohibit B from " using" A's trademark, B does not " use"
A's trademark in the same way he might use, say, A's automobile. "Use" of the trademark
consists in creating another manifestation of the symbol and affixing it to a product. Such use is
thus at bottom merely the performance of acts prohibited (or made tortious) by the law. C
similarly has a right to prohibit B from "using" false statements exaggerating the quality of B's
competing products or maligning the quality of C's products.
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the patentholderof his patent, or even of the rights reflected in the patent
(namely, the right to prohibit competitors from employing a specified
technique). The patentholderpossesses his patent and his right after the
state's infringement,just as he did before. What the infringementdeprives
the patentholderof are the profits he expected to earn as a result of the
monopoly to which the patent entitled him.212Expected profits, however,
are precisely what a Lanham Act plaintiff claims he was deprived of by a
state's false advertising in violation of the Lanham Act.213The Court has
also found trade secrets-" one of the weakest forms of intellectual
property"24-to be "property" for purposes of the Takings Clause.215
" [T]o be the owner of a trade secret means only that one can recover tortlike remediesfor a breachof promise and contractor unjustenrichment-like
remedies for a tort."216 Much the same can be said of the right to be free
from false advertising.217
It is even more difficult to see how other, seemingly uncontroversial
sorts of property rights involve a "right to prohibit others from using"

212. See LivesayWindowCo. v. LivesayIndus.,251 F.2d469, 471 (5thCir. 1958).
213. The Courtin College SavingsBanksuggestedat one point thatthe plaintiff'sproblem
was not thatit lackedproperty,but thatthe statedid not deprivehim of it. See CollegeSav. Bank,
119 S. Ct. at 2225 ("[N]ot everythingwhichprotectspropertyinterestsis designedto remedyor
preventdeprivationsof those propertyinterests.").This suggeststhat the Courtwas relyingon
past cases that seemed to indicate that the Due Process Clause is implicatedonly when the
deprivationis causeddirectlyby the state, ratherthanindirectly.See Terrell,supra note 165, at
919-20 (discussingMartinezv. California,444 U.S. 277 (1980)). If the Courtwas suggestingthat
the statedid not directlycausethe plaintiff'sloss of expectedprofitsbecausethe loss dependedon
the interveningdecisions of clients, the argumentwould appear to apply equally to the
patentholder's
claimof infringementby the state.In any event,the cases thatsuggesta distinction
betweendirectandindirectcausationarebest readto incorporatea proximate-cause
standard.See
id. The LanhamAct entitlesa plaintiffto compensationonly for injuriesproximatelycausedby
the false advertiser'sactions.
214. Heald& Wells, supranote 144, at 856.
215. See Ruckelshausv. Monsanto,467 U.S. 986, 1002-04(1984).
216. Heald& Wells, supranote 144, at 860.
217. ProfessorMerrillarguesthathis insistencethatthe rightto exclude is the sine qua non
of propertycan accommodatethe statusas propertyof "some of the most quintessentialinterests
of the moderncapitaliststate-bank accounts,bonds,commercialpaper,commonstock, and the
like," which he also describesas "choses in action." Merrill,supra note 195, at 750-51. His
explanationshows thathe understandsthe "rightto exclude" to exist wheneverthe law protects
the putativepropertyinterestthroughtort-likeremedies:
The only value reflectedin these interests[i.e., bank accounts,bonds, and stocks] is
their exchange value .... And their exchange value is fully protectedby the law
againstinterferenceby others.These interestsare protectedby criminalrules against
theftandby civil actionsfor misappropriation,
fraud,etc. These legal rulesfunctionin
a mannerdirectlyparallelto the laws againsttrespassthatprotectland and the actions
for theftandreplevinthatprotectchattels.In effect, therefore,the law of theft(together
with its cognatecivil actions)gives the holdersof interestsin choses in actionthe right
to excludeothersfrominterferingwith the exchangevalueof these interests,andthatis
all one needsto give themthe statusof property.
Id. at 751. The LanhamAct does not impose criminalpenalties for false advertising,but if
provisionfor such penaltieswere regardedas necessaryto give people a right to compensation
fromthe state,Congresscouldeasily addthem.
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something.218For example, the Court noted in College Savings Bank that
"[t]he assets of a business (including its goodwill) unquestionably are
219 Certainly, a business's tables and chairs satisfy the "right to
property."
exclude" test, as others can be prohibitedfrom using them. But is it fair to
say thata person can be prohibitedfrom "using" another'sgoodwill? To be
sure, one way A can deprive B of B's goodwill is to try to pass itself off as
B, perhaps by using its trademark.In this respect, the right to goodwill
seems identical to the right to a trademark.But A can also deprive B of
goodwill by making false statements about B. At oral argument, Justice
Scalia appearedwilling to grantthatA deprives B of a propertyright when
it does this.220It seems clear that A also deprives B of goodwill if the two
are competitors and A makes false statements exaggerating its own
product'squality. A false statementexaggeratingthe quality of one product
can be expected to diminish the market for directly competing products.
That is why the statementis made. Moreover,this is the only circumstance
in which B would have a cause of action againstA. The cases confirm that
A deprives B of goodwill when it makes false claims about its own product
that succeed in diminishingthe demandfor B's productor services.22'

218. Muchof the difficultyin describingthe interestprotectedby the LanhamAct in termsof
a "rightto exclude" lies in the lack of a termfor the "thing" from which the "owner"of that
rightis excludingothers.For this reason,one mightobjectthatthese interestsare not "property"
becausethey "arenot discrete'things'at all." Terrell,supranote 181, at 514; see also id. at 514
n.90 ("The necessityfor a 'thing'of some sortis of coursecriticalnot only to the centralcase of
privatepropertyor ownership,but to any of the cases in the propertyset. Withoutit, one of the
necessarydimensionsof the conceptis missing.").But, again,the deficiencyseems to be one of
language,not of rights.In the case of all rights in intellectualproperty,perhapsall intangible
propertyrights,the "thing"thatis regardedas propertyis "some ideationalabstractionor other."
J.W. HARRIS,PROPERTY AND JUSTICE 45 (1996). In some cases, we have a word for the
abstractionthatprovidesthe objectfor a sentencetakingthe form "X has a rightto exclude [or
prohibit]othersfromusing ...." Thatthereis no similarwordfor the rightprotectedby the falseadvertisingprovisionsof the LanhamAct shouldnot obscurethe fact that the plaintiff'srights
underthose provisionsare analyticallythe same as his rightsunderprovisionsthat do supplya
wordfor the abstraction.
219. College Sav. Bank v. FloridaPrepaidPostsecondaryEduc. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct.
2219, 2225 (1999). Thoughthe Courtdid not cite any authorityfor this concession,it could have
cited many cases, including Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 13 (1949).
Authoritiesare collected in 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND
UNFAIR COMPETITION? 2:20, at 2-41 n.1 (4th ed. 1996);Floyd A. Wright,TheNatureand Basis
of Legal Goodwill,24 ILL. L. REV.20, 21 & n.4 (1929) ("[T]herehas been a considerabledegree
of uniformityin treatinggoodwill as property.").But cf Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712 (1976)
(finding that injury to reputationdoes not implicate a propertyor liberty interest).Paul is
discussedinfranote 256.
220. See UnitedStates SupremeCourtOfficialTranscript,College Sav. Bank(No. 98-149),
availablein 1999WL 252691, at *7.
221. See, e.g., Alpo Petfoodsv. RalstonPurinaCo., 913 F.2d 958, 960, 969 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
(Thomas,J.). Indeed,beforeit was amendedin 1988, the LanhamAct gave A a cause of action
againstB for false advertisingonly if B exaggeratedthe qualitiesof its own products,leavingit to
the commonlaw to protectA fromB's false statementsaboutA's products.Yet duringthis period
it was well establishedthatharmto goodwill was one of the measuresof damagesavailableto A.
See U.S. Healthcarev. Blue Cross,898 F.2d 914, 921-23 (3d Cir. 1990).
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That, of course, was precisely the propertyright that the plaintiff was
claiming in College Savings Bank, yet the Court found that the plaintiff
lacked a propertyinterest.The Courtdistinguishedthe " assets of a business
(including its good will)" from "the activity of doing business, or the
activity of making a proft."222 The latter, the Court said, were the only
things of the plaintiff s upon which the defendant's false advertising
"impinged,"223 and those activities, the Courtsaid, are "not propertyin the
ordinarysense."224 But the Court appearsto have drawn a false dichotomy.
The false advertising"impinged" upon the plaintiff s " activity of making a
profit," but it also impinged upon its goodwill, which is a pecuniaryinterest
whose measure is the present value of the expected profits that the
plaintiff s good name could be expected to generatein the future.225
The Court in College Savings Bank considered and appearedto reject
the argument that "all civil rights of a pecuniary nature are property
rights."226It interpretedthe statement in International News Service that
"equity treatsany civil right of a pecuniarynatureas a propertyright"227 as
a statement about a quirk of equity jurisprudence:Equity "treats" such
rights as propertyrights even though they really are not. In the end, though,
the Courtconceded that the pecuniaryright involved in InternationalNews
Service was indeed a propertyright. It thus left us without an example of a
pecuniaryright that is not a propertyright, other than the right the plaintiff
claimed in College Savings Bank. Since, as we have seen, the reasons the
Courtoffered for distinguishingthis right from conceded propertyrights are
unpersuasive,we are left to searchfor otherpossible distinctions.
The defendant's conduct was alleged to have "impinged" upon the
plaintiff's expected profits. Profits are money, and money is quintessential
property. A persuasive distinction would thus isolate the factors that
distinguish such lost profits from money in the bank. Perhaps the key
difference is that lost profits are by definition money that the plaintiff does
not possess. Does lack of possession explain why the plaintiff lacked
property?
The Court's decision last Term in American ManufacturersMutual
Insurance Co. v. Sullivan228suggests thatpossession may be important.The
relevant state law in that case entitled plaintiffs to compensation for

222. College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2225.
223. Id.
224. Id.

225. See generally KimballLaundryCo. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 17 & n.9 (1949);
StandardOil Co. v. Moore,251 F.2d 188, 219 (9th Cir. 1957); 1 MCCARTHY,
supra note 219,
?? 2:17, 2:21; Note, An Inquiry into the Nature of Goodwill, 53 COLUM.L. REv. 660, 677-82
(1953).
226. College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2225.

227. Id. (quotingInternational
News Serv.v. AssociatedPress,248 U.S. 215, 236 (1918)).
228. 119 S. Ct. 977 (1999).
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"reasonable"medical expenses, but it went on to provide that if the insurer
disputed the reasonablenessof the expense, the matterwould be submitted
to an impartial tribunal and the insurer would not have to pay until the
tribunaldeterminedthat the expense was reasonable.The plaintiffs argued
that the proceduredid not afford them due process, but the Court held that
the procedure did not deprive the plaintiffs of a property right. In its
opinion, the Court emphasized that the plaintiffs' right to receive payment
from the defendants would "attach" only after the plaintiffs cleared the
procedural hurdles set forth in the statute. The Court distinguished
Goldberg v. Kelly and Mathews v. Eldridge-cases in which the Courthad
held that an individual had a propertyright to receive a future stream of
welfare payments-on the ground that "[i]n both cases, an individual's
entitlementto benefits had been established,and the questionpresentedwas
whether predeprivationnotice and a hearing were required before the
individual's interest in continued payment of benefits could be
terminated."229Does this suggest that the Due Process Clause protects
persons against state action that takes away something the person already
possesses, but not against state action that denies them something they do
not possess?
A closer look at AmericanManufacturersshows that the Court did not
so hold. First, the benefits claimed by the plaintiffs in Goldberg and
Mathews were not in their possession; indeed, they were not even yet due
and payable to them. If the plaintiffs had been litigating about past-due
benefits, the suit would have been dismissed on Eleventh Amendment
grounds.30What the plaintiffs did possess was an administrativeor judicial
decision "establishing" that they had been eligible for such benefits in the
past. The state claimed that they were no longer eligible, and the Courtheld
that it could terminate future payments only after a hearing. Despite the
Court's emphasis in AmericanManufacturersthat the right to benefits had
already been "established" in Goldberg and Mathews, the Court did not
hold that someone who claims to be eligible for benefits under the law but
does not yet possess an administrative or judicial determination of
eligibility lacks a property right. If it had, its holding would have
contradictedclear precedent.As already noted, it is well established that a
cause of action is a propertyright.231The reason is not hardto perceive. If a
cause of action were not a propertyright until the claimant's entitlementto
damages had been judicially " established," a plaintiff would not be entitled
to due process of law until after he had won his case. A judge who decided
a case against a plaintiff by the flip of a coin, or pursuantto a stated policy

229. Id. at 990.

230. See Edelmanv. Jordan,415 U.S. 651 (1974).
231. See cases citedsupranote 91.
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of always ruling for the defendant, would be violating no constitutionally
guaranteedright to due process. That would be absurd.It is commonly, and
rightly, understoodthatplaintiffs are entitled to due process at trial.232
ThatAmericanManufacturersdoes not hold otherwise is confirmedby
a footnote stating that "[respondents do not contend that they have a
propertyinterestin their claims for payment, as distinct from the payments
themselves."233Had the respondents relied on their claim to payment as
their propertyright, they would presumablyhave lost on the ground that
the state does not " deprive" a person of a claim until the proceedings to
The Court's holding that
determinethe merits of the claim are concluded.234
postponingthe paymentuntil the end of the proceedingdoes not violate due
process was thus fully consistent with the principle that the Due Process
But that is not to say
Clause ordinarilyrequiresa predeprivationhearing.235
that no property right existed before the end of the proceeding. The
claimant possessed a propertyright in the claim, and that is why he was
entitled to a hearing and fair procedures to claim the money, as Justice
Similarly, someone with an asGinsburgemphasizedin her concurrence.236
yet-unestablishedclaim to welfare benefits, like any other plaintiff, should
be entitled to a hearing and the fair procedures guaranteedby the Due
She is just not
Process Clause to establish her eligibility for such benefits.237
entitled to get the money before her eligibility has been determined.238
AmericanManufacturersthus indicates that the money College Savings
Bank expected to make in the futurewas not yet its property.But the case is
consistent with the idea that College Savings Bank possessed a property
right in its expectationthat it would make such money in the future free of

232. See, e.g., Logan v. ZimmermanBrush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 429 (1982) ("The Court
traditionallyhas held thatthe Due ProcessClausesprotectcivil litigantswho seek recoursein the
courts,eitheras defendantshopingto protecttheirpropertyor as plaintiffsattemptingto redress
grievances."(citing Soci6te Internationalev. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958); HammondPacking
Co. v. Arkansas,212 U.S. 322, 349-51 (1909); Hovey v. Elliott,167 U.S. 409 (1897); Windsorv.
McVeigh,93 U.S. 274 (1876))).
233. AmericanMfrs.,119 S. Ct. at 990 n.13. The concurringopinionof JusticeBreyer,joined
by JusticeSouter,emphasizedthis concession.See id. at 991 (Breyer,J., concurringin part).
234. The "state" defendantsin AmericanManufacturerswere local governmentofficials,
whose actions are state action for FourteenthAmendmentpurposes but not for Eleventh
Amendmentpurposes.See V6zquez,supra note 14, at 1704 n.100. The plaintiffsthus would not
have lost on the ground(discussedfurtherbelow) that,in the light of SeminoleTribeandAlden,
individualshaveno rightof actionfor retrospectivemonetaryrelief againstthe state.
235. On the latterprinciple,see, for example,Zinermonv. Burch,494 U.S. 113 (1989), which
holdsthatpredeprivation
proceduralsafeguardsshouldnormallybe requiredbeforean involuntary
confinementof a mentalpatient.
236. See AmericanMfrs.,119 S. Ct. at 991 (Ginsburg,J., concurringin part).
237. Butcf id. at 990-91 n.13 (reservingthe questionandcitingLyngv. Payne,476 U.S. 926,
942 (1986); and Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 320 n.8 (1985)).

238. Goldberg'sholding that someone who has previouslybeen found eligible for such
benefits is entitled by the Due Process Clause to a hearingbefore the streamof benefits is
terminatedis discussedfurtherinfraSectionIII.C.
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false advertising by competitors, even state competitors.239Indeed, as
already noted, "goodwill"-which the Court said was "unquestionably"
property-is the termwe use to describe that streamof futureprofits,just as
" chose in action" is the term we use to describe a plaintiff s right to receive
money from the defendant if he prevails in litigation.240Its status as
propertyis not vitiated by the fact that the plaintiff does not yet possess the
money or the fact that the right to it has not yet been reducedto judgmentor
otherwise "established."241
The Court in College Savings Bank appears to have believed that B
deprives A of propertywhen B makes false statementsabout A's product,
but not when B makes false statements about B's. If so, the Court's
distinction does not have to do with "what" the defendant deprived the
plaintiff of (in both cases it is future profits), but turns instead on more
abstractfeaturesof the defendant'sobligation towardsthe plaintiff, and the
plaintiff's correlative right vis-a-vis the defendant. A distinction between
the obligation not to make false statementsabout one's own products and
the obligation not to make false statementsabout those of one's competitors
may find some supportin traditionalconceptions of property.A traditional
attribute of property-one that is, indeed, closely associated with, and
perhaps traceable to, the right to exclude-is that the owner can give it
away or (what may be the same thing) license its use.242One can say thatA
has the right to license B to malign A's product(thatis, by failing to bring a
lawsuit, or perhaps by agreeing in advance not to do so), but it is
more difficult to say that A has the right to license B to exaggerate the
quality of B's product; under the law, all competitors injured by such
misrepresentationshave a cause of action against B. The Court suggested
that was this was the basis of its holding when it stated, echoing
Blackstone,243that the false-advertisingprovisions of the Lanham Act did
not confer on the petitioner any right over which it had "exclusive
dominion." The Court may have meant that the petitioner lacked
"exclusive dominion" over the right to prevent Florida Prepaid from
239. As notedearlier,thereis no questionthatthe stateis prohibitedfromengagingin false
advertising.See supratext accompanyingnote 198.
240. Becausethe essence of the latterpropertyrightis a rightto makea claim in litigation,
the statedoes not deprivea plaintiffof a chose in actionuntil the end of the proceeding.A state
thatfalsely advertisesandinjuresthe goodwillof a competitor,on the otherhand,wouldappearto
deprivethe competitorof his propertyat the time the false advertisinghas its intendedeffect.
241. Nor is its claim to being propertyunderminedby the fact that its value dependson
predictionsaboutfutureevents. The value of real estate takenby the state similarlydependson
predictionsaboutthe future,yet realestateis unquestionably
property.
242. See J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTYIN LAW80-97 (1997) (discussingthe rightto
abandon,transfer,and give away property,and their relationto the right to exclude); Merrill,
supranote 195, at 743 & n. 43 (same).
243. See 2 BLACKSTONE, supranote 89, at *2 (famouslydefiningpropertyas "thatsole and
despoticdominionwhich one man claims andexercisesover the externalthingsof this world,in
totalexclusionof the rightof any otherindividualin the universe").
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exaggerating the quality of its own product because all competitors who
may be injuredby any act of false advertisingsharedthe right to preclude
such conduct.
If so, then the Courtmay have embraceda definition of "property"that
denies such status to intereststhat can only be injuredthroughconduct that
also injures an indeterminatenumber of others (here, the interest in being
free from pecuniaryinjuriesresulting from someone else's false statements
about his own products).2"Denying individual relief for such widespread
injuries would be consistent with the Court's reference to the principle res
publica, res nullius,245 and it would accord with views that Justice Scalia
has expressed in other contexts.246But this refined "exclusive dominion"
test is hard to defend by reference to any relevant policies,247and it would
be difficult to apply.248The test also fails to support the Court's
conclusions. It might be plausible to say that the plaintiff in College

244. I have formulatedthe definitionthis way in order to accommodatesuch cases as a
government'sdecision to flood a large areaof land. Such actionis clearlya takingof property
even though the conductinjuresa large numberof persons. It satisfies the posited definition
becausethe interestthatconstitutesthe propertycan be (althoughit was not here)injuredthrough
conductthatdoes not also injurean indeterminate
numberof others.
245. See College Sav. Bankv. FloridaPrepaidPostsecondaryEduc.ExpenseBd., 119 S. Ct.
2219, 2224 (1999) (recognizingthat"therightthatwe all possessto use the publiclandsis not the
'property'rightof anyone").
246. See Lujanv. Defendersof Wildlife,504 U.S. 555 (1992); AntoninScalia, TheDoctrine
of Standing as an Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLKU. L. REv. 881, 894-97

(1983). Althoughthereis languagein Lujansuggestingthatan individualcannotsue to protectthe
"public"interest,see Lujan,504 U.S. at 576 ("Vindicatingthepublic interest... is the function
of Congressand the Chief Executive."),the actualholdingallows such suits if the plaintiffcan
show thatshe suffereda particularized
injury,see id. at 579 (Kennedy,J., concurringin partand
concurringin the judgment)(indicatingthat the plaintiffs would have had standinghad they
purchasedairplanetickets).
247. Cf. UnitedStatesv. StudentsChallengingRegulatoryAgencyProcedures(SCRAP),412
U.S. 669, 688 (1973) ("To deny standingto personswho arein fact injuredsimplybecausemany
othersare also injured,would meanthat the most injuriousand widespreadGovernmentactions
could be questionedby nobody. We cannot accept that conclusion.").This aspect of the rule
mightperhapsbe said to advancethe policy, sometimesascribedto sovereignimmunitylaw, of
protectingstate treasuries.See Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2250 (1999). The broaderthe
class of injuredpeople,the greaterthe threatto statetreasuries.This is unconvincing,however,as
the executivebranchremainsavailableto seek compensation,andperhapseven punitiverelief,for
widespreadinjury.A more plausibledefense of the rule would be that individualretrospective
relief is less necessaryin the case of widespreadinjurybecausethe executiveis morelikely to sue
to enforcesuch obligations.See Vazquez,supranote 3. ProfessorJacksonhas suggestedthatthe
rule permittingprospectivebut not retrospectiverelief, even thoughprospectiverelief is just as
costly (perhapsmoreso), maybe justifiedon the groundthatprospectiverelief is likely to benefit
society in general,whereasretrospectiverelief benefitsonly discretepeople,whose interestsmay
well be adverseto that of the generalpublic. See Jackson,supra note 19, at 91. This analysis
would suggest that compensationshould be available in precisely those cases in which the
interpretation
of "property"discussedin the text wouldmakeit unavailableto individuals(thatis,
whenthe injurycausedby the state'sunlawfulactionis widespread).
248. The Court'sattemptsto drawsimilarlines in the contextof standinghave resultedin a
doctrinethatis widely regardedas incoherent.See Steven L. Winter,TheMetaphorof Standing
and the Problemof Self-Governance,40 STAN.L. REv. 1371, 1372-73(1988) (citingjudicialand
scholarlyauthorityfor the propositionthatstandingdoctrineis incoherent).
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Savings Bank lacked exclusive dominion over the defendant's obligation
not to make false statementsabout its own products,but it is less clear that
the plaintiff lacked exclusive dominion over its right to be free of injury as
a result of such conduct. Such individuated injury, when it occurs, is
normally enough to confer standing, even if many others have been
similarly harmed. Moreover, the cause of action for damages that results
when such injuryoccurs is regardedas a propertyright. While it is true that
Alden holds that individuals do not have a cause of action for damages
against states who violate duties imposed pursuantto Article I, Florida
Prepaid shows that the absence of such a cause of action does not negate
the existence of a property right. College Savings Bank itself recognizes
that goodwill is property, and, as already discussed, the plaintiff was
alleging an injury to its goodwill (defined as a legitimate expectation of
future profits). In short, the conclusion that the plaintiff lacked exclusive
dominion over the defendant's conduct fails to explain why the plaintiff
was not suing to protect a propertyright, or why the LanhamAct does not
"remedy or preventdeprivationsof . . . propertyinterests."249
In any event, if this is the line drawn by College Savings Bank, the
definition of property would remain relatively broad, and hence Florida
Prepaid would mean that Alden's holding was of narrower significance
than it appearedto be. Consider the Court's recent decision in Kimel v.
Board of Regents250striking down the abrogation of state sovereign
immunity in the Age Discriminationin Employment Act (ADEA).251The
ADEA prohibits age discrimination with respect to employment, and it
applies to the state as employer. If governmentjobs are property to the
extent that the law places mandatorylimits on the employer's discretion,252
then someone who is fired from such a job or otherwise injuredin violation
of the ADEA would seem to have a due process right to compensatory
relief.253The job-and even the more abstract right to be free from
discrimination-would appear to be property under the "exclusive
dominion" test. The same would be true of the rights to accrued wages
claimed by the employees in Alden,254and indeed of the rights created by
249. College Savings Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2225; see also supra note 213.

250. 120 S. Ct. 631 (2000).
251. 29 U.S.C.A.?? 621-634 (WestSupp.1999).
252. See supranotes 176-179andaccompanyingtext.
253. Someonesubjectedto unlawfuldiscriminationin the hiringprocessmighthave a more
tenuousclaimto a propertyrightin thejob. If she can show thatshe wouldhave gottenthejob but
for the unlawfuldiscrimination,
however,it seems difficultto distinguishher expectationof a job
from a business's expectationof futureprofits.Moreover,she would appearto have exclusive
dominionover the defendant'sobligationnot to discriminateagainsther. But cf. infra note 254
(discussingthe government'spowerto enforcethis obligationwithoutthe employee'sconsent).
254. Thereis one featureof the FLSA andof the federallaws prohibitingdiscriminationin
employmentthatmay requirethe conclusionthattheirviolationdoes not constitutea deprivation
of propertyunderthe test discussedin the text. The FLSAgives the Secretaryof Laborthe power
to maintainan action againstthe employerwithoutpriorwrittenrequestof the employee.See
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many, perhaps most, congressional statutes that establish a right of action
for damages.255
In short, if College Savings Bank holds that the right involved in the
case was not "property"because it could be violated only throughconduct
that similarly injured an indeterminate number of others, then it does
not narrow the scope of the Due Process Clause significantly. Indeed,
the Court's recognition that goodwill is "unquestionably" property may
broadenit a bit.256On the other hand, the test would be difficult to apply in
many contexts, and it would produce anomalous results. Although Justice
Scalia may well have had this rule in mind, it is far from clear that all of the
membersof the majoritywould embracesuch a test.257

Donovanv. BrownEquip.& Serv. Tools, 666 F.2d 148, 156 & n.10 (5th Cir. 1982). Similarly,
underthe federalantidiscrimination
laws, the EqualEmploymentOpportunityCommissionmay
bring an action against an employereven if the employee does not consent. See 42 U.S.C.
? 2000e-5 (1994). Thus,in neithercase does the employeehave the abilityto license the employer
to violatethe law. This illustratesanotheranomalyaboutthe proposedtest: A provisiondesigned
to make the statutemore effective in protectingthe interestsof the employeeshas the effect of
denying the relevantrights the statusof property,and hence of limiting the employee's rights
when the employeris the state. For this reason,the posited test seems implausibleto the extent
thatit woulddeny an employee'srightthe statusof propertyon the groundthatthe government
has been given the power to enforce it. It seems more sensible to assimilatethe government's
powerin such circumstancesto a guardian'spowerto defendthe propertyof a child in court.In
any event, if this were the only reason violationsof these laws did not depriveemployees of
property,Congresscould cure the problemby amendingthe statuteto providethatthe relevant
agencies may bring actionsunderthese laws against the states only if the relevantemployees
consent.An earlierversionof the FLSA allowedthe Secretaryof Laborto bringsuit only "when
requestedby [theaffectedemployees]to do so." Donovan,666 F.2d at 156.
255. An exceptionmightbe the Americanswith DisabilitiesAct, 42 U.S.C. ?? 12101-12213
(1994), which imposes some obligations on states the violation of which would affect an
indeterminate
numberof personswithdisabilities.
256. BeforeCollegeSavingsBank,some lowercourtshadruled,in relianceon Paul v. Davis,
424 U.S. 693 (1976), thatgoodwill is not a propertyright.See WMX Techs. v. Miller, 197 F.3d
367, 374-75 (9thCir. 1999) (findingthatallowingrecoveryfor loss of goodwillis "contraryto the
basic thrustof Paul v. Davis"); CypressIns. Co. v. Clark,144 F.3d 1435, 1436 (11th Cir. 1998)
(stating that an allegationof a loss of goodwill "must be accompaniedby a constitutionally
recognizedinjury").The Courtin Paul heldthata person'sreputationis not by itself property,see
Paul, 424 U.S. at 701, and the lower courtshave equatedgoodwill with reputation.Paul has of
coursebeen severelycriticized,see, e.g., ELY, supranote 165, at 19 & n.31; Jeffries,supranote
134, at 78-79; Monaghan,supra note 166, at 423-29, and for good reason. Justice Scalia's
statementthat goodwill is "unquestionably"property(and apparentlyself-evidentlyas well, as
the Courtcited no authority)shows just how counterintuitivethe Paul holding was, and may
signal a rejectionof that much criticizeddecision. Alternatively,Paul could be squaredwith
CollegeSavingsBankif interpreted
narrowlyas a holdingthatnoneconomicinjuryto reputationis
not property. Goodwill, by contrast, reflects the economic value of reputation.Such an
interpretation
derives supportfrom the Court'sdescriptionof Davis's claimed injuryas purely
stigmatic.See Paul, 424 U.S. at 711-12. Additionally,the Courtin Paul emphasizedthat there
was no law that "extend[ed]to the respondentany legal guaranteeof present enjoymentof
reputation."Id. at 711. By contrast,there is a law, the LanhamAct, that guaranteedCollege
SavingsBankfreedomfromeconomicinjuryresultingfromthe state'sfalse advertising.
257. For example,JusticeKennedywas unwillingto go entirelyalong with JusticeScalia's
similar analysis in Lujan. See Lujanv. Defendersof Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 579-80 (1992)
(Kennedy,J., concurringin partandconcurringin thejudgment).
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While the Court'.s specific holding-that the plaintiff in College
Savings Bank did not possess a propertyinterest that was infringed by the
state-raises more questions than it answers and thus may be of limited
precedential value, there is a strong indication in the opinion of a basic
change in the Court's approachto defining property,and the Court's new
approachbodes ill for the Court's "new property"jurisprudence.As noted,
the Court's earlier cases emphasized that the concepts of liberty and
propertyare broad and majestic and "gather meaning from experience."258
Cases such as Goldberg v. Kelly appearedto reflect a conscious decision to
treat certain rights as property rights for purposes of the Due Process
Clause, even though they had not before been regarded as such.259In
College Savings Bank, however, as alreadynoted, the Courtdistinguisheda
prior case that had indicated that "equity treats any civil right of a
pecuniarynatureas a propertyright" as a statementthat equity treats them
as property rights even though they are not really such.260The Court's
indication that something either is or is not really a propertyright, when
accompaniedby its importationof Takings Clause standardsinto the due
process inquiry, suggests a drastic narrowing of the scope of the Due
Process Clause. It suggests that the Courtmay be poised to reject the cases,
such as Goldberg, in which it decided to treat certain rights as property
rightseven though, from a historicalperspective,they properlywere not.
C. Alden and the Right to Accrued Wages
A comparisonof the right involved in Alden with the right involved in
Goldberg shows either that, under the holding of Florida Prepaid, the
Alden plaintiffs would have been entitled under the Due Process Clause to
the relief the Court in Alden denied them, or that the Court now rejects its
"new property" jurisprudence.26'The law provided that persons who
258. NationalMut.Ins. Co. v. TidewaterIns. Co., 337 U.S. 582, 646 (1949) (Frankfurter,
J.,
dissenting);see also supranote 194 andaccompanyingtext.
259. See Merrill,supra note 195, at 752 (" Goldbergand its progenyare clearly decisions
designedto expandthe scope of dueprocessprotectionfor instrumental
ends.").
260. See supranotes226-227 andaccompanyingtext.
261. ProfessorWoolhandlerfinds the conflict between the Court's approachto defining
propertyin College SavingsBankand the "new property"cases so manifestthat she interprets
last Term's cases as adoptinga distinctionbetween "old property"and "new property."See
Woolhandler,supranote 3. For "old" property,she argues,Florida Prepaidestablishesthatthe
states are requiredto provide a retroactiveremedy, whereasfor "new" propertysuch as was
involved in College Savings Bank, the states are requiredto providefair proceduresbut not a
backward-looking
remedy.See id. This would certainlybe a way to avoid the most disturbing
implicationsof CollegeSavingsBank.But the Courtdid not purportto be drawinga line between
old andnew property.Rather,it held thatthe bankdid not have a propertyright for purposesof
the Due ProcessClause.It is thusdifficultto interpretthe decisionas preservingsome procedural
protectionsin suits involvingnew property.If it had meantto say insteadthat the Due Process
Clauserequiresless processin cases involvingfalse advertising,it could have struckdown the
abrogationof sovereignimmunityin the LanhamAct on the same groundthatit struckdown the
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performedwork undercertain conditions were entitled to a certain level of
payment. The plaintiffs had performed the work and were seeking the
payment.Was their right to accruedwages a propertyinterest?They appear
to have had a legitimate expectation that they would be paid such amounts
if they performedthe work. Indeed, if they had sought an injunctionon an
Ex parte Young theory or under ? 1983, the Eleventh Amendment would
have been no bar.262If their employer had been a private company, they
would have had a claim against the employer for the past-due wages, and
such a claim, as we have seen, would be a propertyright underexisting case
law. Because their employer was the state, they had no cause of action, as
Alden itself holds. But Florida Prepaid indicates that, notwithstanding
sovereign immunity,the state must afford a remedy for illegal deprivations
of property,and the case establishes that a propertyright may exist against

abrogationin the patentlaw. Moreover,as discussedabove,it is difficultto distinguishthe interest
of which the petitionerwas deprivedin College Savings Bank from the interestinvolved in
FloridaPrepaid.It is thushardto see why the formerfalls in the "new property"category,while
the latter is " old property." See Jackson, Principle and Compromise, supra note 3.

The attitudetoward the new propertycases of the members of the Court's Eleventh
Amendmentmajorityis illustratedby a recentexchange at an oral argument.In responseto a
lawyer's invocationof Logan v. ZimmermanBrush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982), Chief Justice
RehnquistquippedthatLogan was "way out on the margin."The lawyerpromptlyagreedand
withdrewhis relianceon the case. UnitedStatesSupremeCourtOfficialTranscript,UnitedStates
v. Martinez-Salazar
(submittedNov. 29, 1999) (No. 98-1255), availablein 1999 WL 1134649,at
*42; see also U.S. SupremeCourtOfficialTranscript,
Bakerv. GeneralMotorsCo., 522 U.S. 222
(1998) (No. 96-653), available in 1997 WL 638425, at *16 ("I don't think you'll find much
dispositionon the Courtto enlargeLoganv. Zimmerman.").
262. See 42 U.S.C. ? 1983 (1994);Exparte Young,209 U.S. 123 (1908). No suchinjunction
was necessaryin Alden,becausethe stateshad concededlycome into compliancewith the FLSA
by the timeof the lawsuit.
It appears that the FLSA, as currentlywritten, authorizesemployees to obtain such
injunctionsonly if the state is alleged to be violating its provisions concerningretaliatory
discharge.See 29 U.S.C. ? 216(b) (1994) (authorizingsuits by employeesfor "legal or equitable
relief" for violationof the prohibitionof retaliatorydischarge).It authorizesthe Secretaryof
Laborto seek an injunctionrequiringcompliancewith the FLSA's otherprovisions,see id. ? 217,
and it authorizesemployees to sue for money damages for violations of minimum-wageand
minimum-hour
provisions,see id. ? 216(b). The FLSA's failureto authorizeemployeesto obtain
injunctiverelief againstemployerswho violatethe minimum-wageandminimum-hour
provisions
may well precludesuch relief againststate officials underan Ex parte Youngtheoryor under
? 1983. Cf Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 74 (1996) (finding prospectiverelief
unavailableunderExparte Youngif suchrelief wouldbe incompatiblewiththe statutoryscheme);
Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea ClammersAss'n, 453 U.S. 1, 20 (1981)
(findingthe same under? 1983). But cf. Wrightv. City of RoanokeRedev. & Hous. Auth.,479
U.S. 418, 425 (1987) (findinga strongpresumptionthat relief under? 1983 is not barredby a
statutecreatingsubstantiverights).ProfessorMeltzerhas expressedthe view thatCongresswould
have to amendthe FLSA to authorizeemployeesto obtaininjunctiverelief againstofficials. See
Meltzer,supranote 3. If the only reasonthe employeesin Aldenlackeda propertyinterestin their
accruedwages (andhence a rightto compensatoryrelief) was, ironically,thatthe statuteentitled
themonly to backpay,cf. supranote 210 (citing authorityfor the propositionthatpropertyexists
if the rightholdermay seek specific performance),Congresscould easily fix the problemby
authorizinginjunctiverelief. But cf. College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2225 (finding that the
petitionerlackeda propertyinteresteven thoughthe relevantstatuteentitledit to injunctiverelief).
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the state even if sovereign immunitywould otherwise protectthe state from
damage suits.
Do employees who are legally entitled to be paid a minimum wage
have a propertyinterest in their past-due wages separatefrom the cause of
action Congress purportedto give them? If the answer is no, it is driven by
the demands of the sovereign immunity doctrine, not by any coherent
understandingof the concept of property. The employees clearly had a
substantiveright to the wages. As noted, state sovereign immunity would
not bar a suit for prospectiverelief underEx parte Youngor ? 1983 (unless
Congress is deemed to have forbidden it).263Yet prospective relief would
necessarily rest on the proposition that they had a right to be paid such
wages in the future when and if they performed the work.2MIt seems
incoherent to say that before earning the wages, the employees had a
conditional right to be paid such wages, but, having satisfied the condition,
they now have no rightto the wages.
Admittedly, the employees' right to prospective relief does not show
that the employees had a property right in their accrued wages. Section
1983 authorizesprospectiverelief to enforce federal rights even if they are
not property rights. It would be consistent with the availability of
prospectiverelief to say that a right to money is not a propertyright unless
it is accompaniedby a right to maintainan action against the employer in
court. If so, the employees would lack a property right in their accrued
wages because sovereign immunitydenies them a cause of action. But this
conclusion would be inconsistent with Florida Prepaid and other cases in
which a propertyright was found to have been created against a state by
federal legislation enacted under Article 1.265 In the light of Seminole Tribe
and Alden, all such cases establish that the existence of a property right
against the state does not turn on the putativepropertyholder's capacity to
enforce the right againstthe state in court. Alden's right to accruedwages is
distinguishable from conceded property rights, such as causes of action,
solely on the ground that, because of sovereign immunity, he lacked the
capacity to maintainan action in court for money damages after the right

263. Any such conclusionwould be questionable.At any rate,Congresscan easily fix that
problemif doing so were necessaryto entitleemployeesto compensatoryrelief againstthe state
on a due processtheory.
264. Prospectiverelief would be availableonly if the plaintiffcould show that the act or
omissionthreatenedby the defendant,if carriedout, wouldinfringethe plaintiffs federalrights.
265. See, e.g., Mathewsv. Eldridge,424 U.S. 319 (1976); Goldbergv. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970). This standardalso seems inconsistentwith the cases holdingthatthe Due ProcessClause
is itself sometimesthe sourceof a remedialobligation,andwiththe decisionsestablishingthatthe
contoursof a propertyright,and thus of a state's proceduralobligationsunderthe Due Process
Clause,arenot subjectto the procedurallimits the statehas establishedin creatingthe right.See
ClevelandBd. of Educ.v. Loudermill,470 U.S. 532 (1985) (rejectingJusticeRehnquist's"bitter
with the sweet"doctrine).
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had accrued.If such capacity is not a sine qua non of property,it seems to
follow thatAlden's right to accruedwages is property.
The conclusion that state employees lack a property right in their
accruedwages once they have earnedthem conflicts even more clearly with
the "new property"cases. In those cases, persons who had been receiving
benefits in the past obtained an injunctionin the federal courts prohibiting
the state from failing to pay them benefits due in the future without first
holding a hearing to establish their ineligibility for the benefits. In
upholding that relief, the Court concluded that the plaintiffs had a property
interestin their benefits. Analytically, benefits seem indistinguishablefrom
accruedwages: They are both statutorilygroundedrights to receive money
from the state. If the former is a propertyright, then it seems difficult to
deny that status to the latter.266
Although the benefits at issue in Goldberg
were unaccrued,Alden need not claim that unaccruedbenefits are property.
The plaintiffs in Goldberg would have been entitled to prospective relief
only if they could show that a violation of their federal rights was
threatened.The federal right at issue was the right to due process, a right
that exists only with respect to "property"and "liberty."267 The plaintiffs
in these cases thus had to show not only that they had a right to receive
benefits once the benefits accrued, but also that what they were claiming
they were eligible for would, once accrued,be a propertyright.268
The "new
property" cases thus establish that someone who has an accrued right to
money from the state has a property right, notwithstandingthe state's
sovereign immunity. If so, then the Due Process Clause, as construed in
Florida Prepaid, required the state to afford an adequate remedy to the
plaintiffs in Alden.269
266. I doubtthatthe Courtwould seek to distinguishthe rightto benefitsfrom the rightto
wages because of the former'simportance,or on some similarground.College Savings Bank
purportsto reston notionsaboutthe essence of a propertyright.If this essence turnson historyor
tradition,the most plausible basis for distinguishingbetween the two would be the longdiscrediteddistinctionbetweenrightsandprivileges.A resurrectionof thatdistinction,however,
would lead the Courtto concludethat accruedwages are property,but that welfarebenefitsor
continuedgovernmentemploymentis not.
267. The benefitsin Goldbergand Mathewshad theirsourcesin both federaland state law,
but the plaintiffswere suing to enforcetheirconstitutionaldue processrights.The Courtwould
presumablyhave decidedthose cases the same way had the benefitsbeen entirelycreaturesof
statelaw. See AmericanMfrs.Mut.Ins. Co. v. Sullivan,119 S. Ct. 977, 982 (1999) (consideringa
due process claim in the context of state-createdbenefits and distinguishingGoldberg and
Mathewson othergrounds).Wherethe benefitsare creaturesof state law, the only conceivable
basis for federal-courtrelief under? 1983 would be the due process claim, which turnson the
conclusionthata rightto the benefits,once accrued,is a propertyright.
268. Because they were litigating about the timing of the right to a hearingconcerning
eligibility,the Goldbergplaintiffsdid not in fact have to show thatthey wouldhave been eligible
for the benefitsin the future,but the resolutionof the case does rest on the conclusionthatwhat
they wereclaimingthey wereeligible for is a propertyrightonce accrued.
269. As discussed in Part II, the Court in Florida Prepaid made it clear that a state
"deprives"personsof propertyonly when it acts willfully. See supra text accompanyingnote
108. As discussedabove, this may meanthata deprivationdoes not occurif the federallaw that
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American Manufacturerssuggests that the Court might distinguish the
right involved in Goldberg from the right involved in Alden on the ground
that the right of the welfare recipient to benefits had already been
established by an administrativeagency or court, while the employees'
right to the wages had not been. As noted above, even without an
administrativeor judicial decree, an employee would have a propertyright
against a private employer who failed to pay accrued wages. But that
propertyright takes the form of a cause of action, and a state employee
lacks a cause of action because the state is immune. Perhaps the Court
would say that employees or welfare recipients have a property right in
wages or benefits once they accrue only if they also have an administrative
or judicial decree establishing their right, but otherwise they have, at best,
merely a cause of action. If the entity that owes the benefits or wages is
immune, however, there would be no cause of action and thus no property
right.
Again, this standard would accommodate the sovereign immunity
cases, but only by molding the definition of propertyaroundthem. Yet this
standardtoo would conflict with the cases. A patent might be property
under this test because the process of procuring a patent includes
the issuance of a document by an administrative agency (a sort of
administrative"establishment" of the right). But trademarkrights based
on the common law, or rights under federal law based on an unregistered
copyright, would appear not to be protected. This conflicts with the
suggestion in College Savings Bank that trademarksand copyrights are
property, as well as with cases finding that trade secrets are property.270
Indeed, the Court's concession that goodwill is property contradicts the
claim that prior adjudicationis a necessary element of a propertyright.271
AmericanManufacturersrecognizes that someone whose eligibility for past
installmentshas been judicially or administrativelyestablishedis entitled to
be paid future installments even if he is substantively ineligible for them
unless his ineligibility has been establishedthroughspecified procedures.It
does not hold or even imply that someone who claims to be owed money

the stateviolatedwas not "clearlyestablished."See supra text accompanyingnotes 124-127. If
so, thenthe plaintiffsin Aldenmighthave lost theirDue Processclaim on thatground,as the state
apparentlydisputedits legal obligationon the facts. See Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2269
(1999) (describingthe parties'respectivepositionswhen the suit was commencedas "an initial
good-faithdisagreementaboutthe requirementsof the FLSA").But cf. supratext accompanying
notes 124-127(discussingwhethera due processrightto compensationfor deprivationof property
is subjectto an exceptionfor deprivationsthatviolatenot-clearly-established
law).
270. See, e.g., Ruckelshausv. MonsantoCo., 467 U.S. 986, 1002-04(1984).
271. The Courtcould,I suppose,hold thatpriorjudicialor administrative
"establishment"of
eligibilityis necessaryonly if the claimedpropertyrightis a rightto moneyfromthe state,butthis
would make it entirelytransparent
that the sovereignimmunitytail is wagging the due process
dog.

2000]

Sovereign Immunityand Due Process

1979

for work alreadyperformedlacks a propertyright until after his right to the
money has been established.
In sum, the new propertycases appearto requirethe conclusion that the
right to accrued wages involved in Alden was a propertyright within the
meaning of the Due Process Clause, and that the state was thus requiredby
that clause to afford an adequateremedy in its own courts.If accruedwages
and goodwill are propertyrights, however, then Alden's holding that states
need not entertainsuits against themselves in their own courts would mean
very little. If accrued wages are property,then so, it seems, would be any
unliquidateddebt. Louisiana would accordingly have been requiredby the
Due Process Clause to provide a remedy against itself for deprivationof its
debt to Hans. Similarly,the retrospectivemonetaryrelief found unavailable
in federal court in Edelman v. Jordan272and like cases would be available,
as a matterof due process, in the state courts. If goodwill is property,then
the Due Process Clause would appearto requirea remedy for any injury(or
at least any economic injury)resultingfrom the state's violation of a federal
statuteestablishing a right of action for compensatoryrelief.273If so, Alden
would be reduced to holding that states cannot be sued without their
consent for negligent conduct or for noncompensatoryrelief. This would
accord with the idea, supported by past decisions, that the Due Process
Clause protects "all the interests in personal security . . . which had been
protected from private interferenceby the common-law courts."274But the
Courtin Alden left no doubt that it believed Louisianawas perfectly free to
deny Hans a remedy against itself in its courts.275
And the Courtin College
Savings Bank appeared to reject the idea that the Due Process Clause
protects all interests protectedby the common law when it quoted Paul v.
Davis's dictumthatthe Due Process Clause is not a "font of tortlaw."276
If the Court's definition of property in College Savings Bank was
driven by a perceived need to keep the Due Process Clause from becoming
a font of tort law and thus gutting its recent sovereign immunity holdings,
then the Court's project will require it to narrow as well the definition of
liberty.277Until recently, the Court basically applied the same test for the
two concepts, a test that turned on whether the law placed mandatory

272. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
273. Indeed,the Due ProcessClausewouldrequirea remedyeven if Congressdid not create
a rightto compensatoryrelief.
274. Monaghan,supra note 166, at 423 (citingButler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328 (1916), for the
propositionthatthe conceptof "liberty"embracesall suchrights).
275. See Aldenv. Maine,119 S. Ct. 2240, 2262-63 (1999).
276. College Sav. Bank v. FloridaPrepaidPostsecondaryEduc. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct.
2219, 2225 (1999) (quotingPaulv. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976)).
277. Cf. Terrell,supra note 181, at 513 (proposinga narrowdefinitionof "property"but a
broad definition of "liberty" that would include "any ... right relating to use of the court
system").
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In Sandin v. Conner, the Court selflimitations on the state's discretion.278
consciously departedfrom this approachwith respect to the putative liberty
interests of prisoners, but it indicated that the prior approach "may be
entirely sensible" with respect to " the rights and remedies available to the
general public."279Salvaging the Court's sovereign immunity holdings,
however, will requirea narrowingof libertyfor the generalpublic as well.
The Court's approachto defining " liberty" in Sandin, like its approach
to "property"in Goldberg and similarcases, was avowedly functional:The
Court took account of "due process" interests in the context of prison
litigation and defined liberty to advance them. In College Savings Bank, by
contrast,the Court purportedto look (albeit vainly) for the essence of the
idea of property.If the Court in fact narrowedthe definition of propertyin
order to salvage its sovereign immunity precedents,however, its approach
was in the end just as instrumentalas that in Goldberg and Sandin. But
there would be an importantdifference (besides lack of candor):The latter
cases defined propertyand liberty to advance the goals of the Due Process
Clause, a clause whose presence in the Constitutionis a testament to our
commitmentto the rule of law. College Savings Bank, on the other hand,
may have defined these concepts in such a way as to accommodate the
Court's holdings affirming a doctrine that is widely regardedas conflicting
with the ideal of the rule of law-and, indeed, is closely associated with
"legal irresponsibility."280 The latterdoctrinehas been defended largely on
historical grounds, most persuasively on grounds of stare decisis.281
Functional defenses of the doctrine of sovereign immunity have been
typically confined to the claim that its effects are not so pernicious as to
justify a departure from precedent.282College Savings Bank, however,
suggests that the doctrine is beginning to produce quite pernicious effects
well beyond the usual sphereof its application.
IV. CONCLUSION

It seems unlikely that the Court in Alden intended to articulate a
principlethat it understoodwas being substantiallyundone on the same day
by the due process principle articulatedin Florida Prepaid. Some of the
Court's language in College Savings Bank, when considered alongside
Alden, suggests strongly that the Court means to maintain a robust
sovereign immunity doctrine by narrowing significantly the definition of
the "property"protectedby the due process principle. The many doctrinal
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.

See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472,479-80 (1995).
Id. at 481.
Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 306 U.S. 381, 388 (1939).
See generally Vdzquez, supra note 11, at 86-88.
See id. at 87.
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conundrumsposed but not directly addressed by the opinions, however,
indicate that, while the Court may intend to move in this direction, it has
not completely worked throughthe implicationsof its holdings.
Anticipating Alden three years ago, I suggested in the pages of this
journal that narrowingthe definition of propertyand liberty would be a bad
way to addressthe doctrinalproblems that the decision would pose.283Due
process is essential to the rule of law. To narrow the scope of the Due
Process Clause to accommodate sovereign immunity only compounds the
rule-of-law problems traceableto a doctrine that is already highly suspect
from a rule-of-law perspective. I suggested an alternative solution to the
doctrinalproblems:Interpretthe Due Process Clause as protectinga broad
range of propertyand liberty interests and as requiringa hearing (although
not necessarily a predeprivationhearing) and fair procedures, but not a
remedy against the state itself. The constitutionally required remedy, I
suggested, is one against state officials who violate federal law.284Because
sovereign immunity,undercurrentdoctrine,does not bar suits against state
officials, an officer-liability regime of constitutionalremedies need not be
designed aroundthe Eleventh Amendmentor state sovereign immunity.
An alternative solution to these doctrinal problems would be to
abandon the doctrine of sovereign immunity recognized in such cases as
Seminole Tribe and Alden. In my previous article, I suggested that as long
as officers remain answerablefor the states' violations of federal law, the
doctrine of sovereign immunity, as eventually recognized in Alden, would
be tolerable from a rule-of-law perspective.285The Court's more recent
cases, however, require two qualifications. First, the Court's recent
decisions may signal a contraction of the basic procedural protections
guaranteedby the Due Process Clause.286Second, the Court's sovereign
immunity and due process decisions have produced a doctrinalmaze that,
with every new case, becomes more bewildering in its complexity.
Doctrinal complexity is problematic from a rule-of-law perspective. A
principal point of law is to guide human conduct, and, to this end, a
measureof certaintyand predictabilityin the law is essential. Constitutional
doctrine that can be understood,if at all, only with the sorts of conceptual
pirouettes attempted in Part III of this Essay cannot hope to provide
meaningfulguidance to litigants or lower courts, or even to the Courtitself,
let alone to ordinary citizens. That is unacceptable from a rule-of-law
perspective.
283. See Vdzquez,supranote 14, at 1751-53.
284. See id. at 1770-85.
285. See id. at 1790-804.
286. The recentdecisions may also signal a contractionof remediesavailableagainststate
officials. See, e.g., Idahov. Coeurd'Alene Tribe,521 U.S. 261 (1997), discussedin Vdzquez,
supra note 11, at 42-51, 83-94. If so, then denying remedies against the state itself is more
problematic.See id.

